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LEGISLATION
College Disciplinary Proceedings
It is a matter of common knowledge that college age Americans are
being encouraged to continue their formal education, at least through
the baccalaureate level, with an intensity never before observed.
These young people are assured that their prospects for future success
are directly related to their level of achievement in the classroom.
This emphasis on extended schooling is obviously well placed for
many students, and their interest in being allowed to pursue and
complete a program of study is a vital one. Institutions of higher
learning have a correlative vital interest as they meet and cope with
burgeoning enrollments-the maintenance of order and discipline
among their students, including the power to expel and to administer
other appropriate punishment. Actually, of course, neither the individual student's interest in completing his education nor the individual
college's interest in maintaining reasonable discipline are phenomena
originating in the current emphasis on higher learning. But the sheer
size of present and predicted enrollments, brought on both by population increase and by the apparent prerequisite of college training to
financial and cultural fulfillment, may make the reconciliation of
these sometimes opposing interests more significant to society as a
whole than ever before.
Tim PROBLEM

It can probably be safely assumed that the vast majority of incidents of college or university discipline are settled completely within
the administrative machinery of the school concerned. This should
continue to be true. But it has been by no means uncommon for
students to seek the aid of the courts in their efforts to have adverse
decisions by school authorities reversed. Generally, courts have been
understandably reluctant to intervene in matters which possess, in
the view of the judges, so much of the appearance of parent-child
relationships.' There has developed, however, a significant body
of case law in which courts have wrestled with this problem, and the
decisions have evolved some reasonably discernible rules.
The most prominent question raised by a student's resort to court
for review of his dismissal from school is whether the school authori1. John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924); Gott v. Berea
College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
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ties have violated some right which the court is obligated to protect.2
The inquiry into this matter has traditionally proceeded upon a
determination of whether the authorities involved abused their discretion, or, stated another way, whether they treated the student unfairly.3 The general rule appears to be that students are entitled to
some type of hearing before being dismissed, at least insofar as taxsupported schools are concerned. Concededly, however, this statement must be based in large measure on dicta,4 or on inference,"
because most of the decisions have turned on the adequacy of the
hearing rather than on the precise question of whether the student
was entitled to a hearing at all. In most cases, the hearings have
been held to be adequate. 6 Two cases in recent years, one decided
by the Fifth Circuit7 and the other by a federal district court in
Tennessee, 8 have squarely held that the students involved were
2. The term "right" is used here as it applies to an evaluation of how a student
should be treated in connection with the exercise by college authorities of their
disciplinary powers, and not in the context of whether attendance at a college is a
"right" or a privilege. The more recent and better reasoned decisions have disregarded the latter concept as the proper basis for extending or withholding the court's
aid in reviewing school discipline. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294
F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1005 (1962).
The court stated that "the State cannot condition the granting of even a privilege
upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process." Id. at 156.
See also Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961), in
which the court stated: "Whether the interest involved be described as a right or a
privilege, the fact remains that it is an interest of almost incalculable value, especially
to those students who have already enrolled in the institution and begun the pursuit
of their college training." Id. at 178.
3. Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So.2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942); Tanton v.
McKenney, 226 ,Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924); John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt,
supra note 1; Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C. C. R. 144, 11 Ohio C.C.
Dec. 515 (1901).
4. Due v. Florida A & M Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 401 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (dictum);
People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 211, 134 N.E.2d 635,
637 (1956) (quoting Smith v. Board of Educ., 182 Ill. App. 342, 346 (1913)); State
ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, supra note 3, at 827.
5. In re Carter, 262 N.C. 360, 137 S.E.2d 150 (1964); Tanton v. MeKenney, supra
note 3; State ex rel Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433, cert. denied, 277
U.S. 591 (1928).
6. Due v. Florida A & M Univ., supra note 4; People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of
Trustees, supra note 4; State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, supra note 3; Tanton v.
McKenney, supra note 3; State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, supra note 5. But see In re
Carter, supra note 5, in which the trial court, basing its jurisdiction of the case on
N. C. GE.N.STAT. §§ 143-315 (1964), which provides for judicial review of administrative decisions by state agencies, apparently found that there had been an adequate
hearing but ordered a new hearing by the college on the ground that new evidence
which had been introduced for the first time during the court's review would compel
the college to reverse its dismissal of the student. The case reached the higher court
on a procedural question and the finding and order of the lower court were allowed
to stand.
7. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.of Educ., supra note 2.
8. Knight v. State Bd.of Educ., supranote 2.
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entitled to a hearing before being expelled from state colleges, and
the holdings were grounded on the due process requirement of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.9 At least
one earlier case expressly denied that the due process clause was
applicable to student discipline.'? The question whether a private
college must offer the accused student an opportunity to be heard has

been even more troublesome to the courts, but several cases have
indicated that some hearing is required." There are, however, cases
which take a strong position to the contrary, emphasizing the contractual basis of the relationship between students and private schools.
These courts base their holdings upon a finding that the private
college reserved a power of summary dismissal in its catalog, or in
some other part of the contract of enrollment. 12 The courts have
frequently stated, in cases dealing with private schools 3 as well as
those involving state schools, 14 that the college authorities must not
act arbitrarily or in abuse of their discretion, but the presumption
against such behavior appears to be deeply rooted.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, supra note 3.
11. "Hearing" in the context of private school discipline probably includes even
less formal procedures than it does as applied to the state school cases. In Robinson
v. University of Miami, supra note 3, a student was required to withdraw from a
teacher training course after having been accorded some type of interview with
school officials concerning the matter, but without having been told the precise reason
for their action. The court upheld the dismissal and pointed to the "hearing," but
also stated its approval of the "rule" that private schools may reserve a power to
dismiss students for any reason without divulging their reasons for doing so. In John
B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, supra note 1, it appeared that the student had been
interviewed by school officials prior to being dismissed for misconduct, and the court
upheld the dismissal, stating that the school was not obligated to prefer charges and
prove them at a "trial" before dismissing a student. In State ex rel. Arbour v. Board
of Managers of Presbyterian Hosp., 131 La. 163, 59 So. 108 (1912), the court said
by way of dictum that if the dismissed student nurse had not waived the 'right, she
was entitled to notice and a public hearing. In Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 98 Md.
623, 57 At. 14 (1904), the court held that the expelled student was entitled to a
hearing. In Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C. C. R. 144, 157, 11 Ohio
C.C. Dec. 515, 523 (1901), the court laid down the following rule: "[The private
school] should give the student ... every fair opportunity of showing his innocence.
They should be careful in receiving evidence against him; they should weigh it;
determine whether it comes from a source freighted with prejudice; determine the
likelihood, by all surrounding circumstances, as to who is right, and then act upon it
as jurors, with calmness, consideration and fair minds .... "
12. Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957); Anthony v.
Syracuse Univ., 244 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928); Baker v. Bryn Mawr
College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 Atl. 220 (1923).
13. Robinson v. University of Miami, supra note 3; Frank v. Marquette Univ.,
209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932); John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, supra note 1;
Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., supra note 3.
14. In re Carter, supra note 5; Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., supra note
2; State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, supra note 3; Tanton v. McKenney, supra note 3;
State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, supranote 5.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 18

Beyond the generally phrased requirement of fairness, the courts

have been prone to uphold almost any form of hearing, and the
student who has been expelled from college for alleged misconduct

after having been accorded an opportunity to tell his side of the story
to school officials may well find the courts unwilling to look further

into the quality of the hearing given him. The judges universally
agree that college authorities are not obligated to hold full judicial

hearings, or to observe strict rules of procedure and evidence."5

The wisdom of this position cannot be seriously challenged, but it
is submitted that a student accused of a violation of regulations for
which expulsion or extended suspension is a possible penalty should
be accorded a procedure more formal than an interview in which

he is simply permitted to deny that of which he is accused.1

The

case of Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education upholds this

proposition as it relates to the facts involved, and the court there
engaged in a forthright analysis of the procedure to be followed

prior to dismissal of students from state colleges for alleged mis7
conduct.'
An even more difficult problem is presented to the courts when a
15. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., supra note 2; People ex rel. Bluett v.
Board of Trustees, supra note 4; State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, supra note 3; John
B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, supra note 1; Barker v. Bryn Mawr College, supra note 12.
16. See Seavey, Dismissal of Students: Due Process, 70 HAnv. L. RBv. 1406 (1957).
17. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., supra note 2, at 158-59. "For the guidance
of the parties in the event of further proceedings, we state our views on the nature of
the notice and hearing required by due process prior to expulsion from a state college
or university. They should, we think, comply with the following standards. The notice
should contain a statement of the specific charges and grounds which, if proven, would
justify expulsion under the regulations of the Board of Education. The nature of the
hearing should vary depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. The
case before us requires something more than an informal interview with an administrative authority of the college. By its nature, a charge of misconduct, as opposed to
a failure to meet the scholastic standards of the college, depends upon a collection
of the facts concerning the charged misconduct, easily colored by the point of view of
the witnesses. In such circumstances, a hearing which gives the Board or the
administrative authorities of the college an opportunity to hear both sides in considerable detail is best suited to protect the rights of all involved. This is not to
imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is
required. Such a hearing, with the attending publicity and disturbance of college
activities, might be detrimental to the college's educational atmosphere and impractical
to carry out. Nevertheless, the rudiments of an adversary proceeding may be preserved
without encroaching upon the interests of the college. In the instant case, the student
should be given the names of the witnesses against him and an oral or written report
on the facts to which each witness testifies. He should also be given the opportunity
to present to the Board, or at least to an administrative official of the college, his
own defense against the charges and to produce either oral testimony or written
affidavits of witnesses in his behalf. If the hearing is not before the Board directly,
the results and findings of the hearing should be presented in a report open to the
student's inspection. If these rudimentary elements of fair play are followed in a
case of misconduct of this particular type, we feel that the requirements of due
process of law will have been fulfilled."
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student challenges not the adequacy of the hearing held prior to his
dismissal, but the power of the school to enforce the regulation which
he is charged with violating. The authorities of a private school may
apparently enforce virtually any regulation which they deem wise; the
enrolling student is held to have consented to the regulation as a term
of his contract. 18 There is judicial language to the effect that disciplinary action taken under a regulation that contravenes "common right"
or is "palpably unreasonable" will not be upheld by the courts, but
again the presumption is in favor of the reasonableness of the regulation.' 9 Much the same rule applies with reference to state schools,
but the courts have indicated a greater willingness to review the
2
reasonableness of the regulations enforced by these institutions. 0
Nevertheless, there have been no reported cases in recent years in
which regulations were actually held to be unreasonable. The polestar of judicial analysis in this area is the broad discretion that school
authorities possess in maintaining order and decorum within their
institutions, and the courts are reluctant indeed to find an abuse of
that discretion.21
It is apparent then that the individual studenfs chances of persuading a court to interfere with school officials on his behalf are
uncertain at best, at least where the officials can show that they went
through some form of hearing prior to dismissing the student. Moreover, a realistic forecast seems to indicate that additional years of
case development will be required to shape a significantly improved
judicial attitude. In this atmosphere it would seem that the social
importance of higher learning, the necessity for reserving to the
18. Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962). In
this case students at a Catholic university were expelled for participating in a civil
wedding ceremony. The court upheld the action which was taken pursuant to a
regulation, reserving to the university the right to dismiss students on any grounds
judged advisable by the university. John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, supra note 1, and
Gott v. Berea College, supra note 1, discuss the broad discretion which private schools
have in formulating regulations.
19. John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, supra note 1, at 517, 102 So. at 640. The court
gave no specific examples of regulations which would be struck down.
20. In Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., supra note 2, the court reached its holding
that a hearing was required at least partly on the ground that to hold otherwise would
give an unreasonable effect to a school regulation which called for prompt dismissal
of students who were convicted in a court of law of charges involving personal misconduct trending to reflect on the institution. The court held that the college authorities
could not have known from the reports of the students' arrests which they received
whether their conduct came within this category, and that a hearing was required to
determine this fact. The court reasoned that it would be unreasonable to interpret
the regulation as requiring summary dismissal based on no more knowledge as to the
nature of the charges against the students than was then available. John B. Stetson
Univ. v. Hunt, supra note 1, at 516, 102 So. at 640 (dictum).
21. Carr v. St. John's Univ., supra note 18; John B. Stetson v. Hunt, supra note 1;
Gott v. Berea College, supra note 1.
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institutions proper disciplinary powers, and the desirability of increased stability in this area of the law, all indicate that carefully
drafted state legislation, designed to deal at least with tax supported
schools, may serve a useful purpose.
EXISTING LEGISLATION

-

In those jurisdictions which presently have statutes requiring some
form of hearing in connection with school discipline, the primary
emphasis seems to be on the public schools, presumably through high
school level.2 The procedure which appears to be most often followed is for the local school board to hold a hearing, either prior to a
student's expulsion23 or afterward upon appeal by the student or his
parents.24 The requirements respecting the adequacy of the hearing
typically include some statement in writing setting down the charges
against the student, and giving notice of the pending hearing.25 It is
significant that some of these statutes expressly provide that the
decision of the school board,2 6 or of the commissioner of education, 27
shall be final, and that no further appeal will be allowed in the courts.
In one jurisdiction, however, the statute provides that the town may be
held liable in tort for wrongful exclusion of a child from the public
schools.2
Some of the statutes lack specific grounds for expulsion, mentioning
only such general grounds as "conduct inimical to the best interests
of the school," 29 "disobedience," or "misconduct."30 Thus the broad
discretion of school authorities which is held in such high esteem by
the courts in the college and university cases is protected in the
public school discipline statutes.
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION

Since the most pronounced confusion concerning the right to hearing, and the kind of hearing, exists in the realm of college discipline,
22. CAL. EDUC. CoDE § 10601; CONN. GEN. STAT. RIEv. § 10-234 (1958); MASS.
ANN. LAws cb. 76, §§ 16, 17 (1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1318 (1962).

But see N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 310, which is framed in much broader language and is
apparently applicable to institutions of higher learning.
23. CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-234 (1958); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 76, § 17 (1954);
PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 24, § 13-1318 (1962).
24. CAL. EDuc. CoDE

§

10601; N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 310.

25. Corr,. GEN.STAT. REV. § 10-234 (1958); MASS. AuNN. LAws ch. 76, § 16 (1954).
26. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 10601.
27. N.Y. EDUc. LAw § 310.

28. MAss. ANN.LAws ch. 76, § 16 (1954).
29. CoNN. GENs.STAT. REv. § 10-234 (1958).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1318 (1962).
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it appears that there is a distinct place for legislation atuned primarily
to the institutions of higher learning. The first step in properly
sorting out the roles and powers of state school officials and the
courts would seem to be a more precise statement, in legislative
language, of the policy of the state with regard to the limits to be
imposed on the schools in the sphere of regulations of conduct. It is
significant that in the two most recent cases in which the courts have
required hearings to be held, the student conduct complained of was
not simple rowdyism, but was participation in racial demonstrations
incidental to efforts to break down segregation barriers. 3 ' It is
immediately apparent that conflicts in views between school officials
and students as to the propriety of such demonstrations are inevitable.
But, while excesses in any form on the part of the students may
establish legitimate grounds for censure and even expulsion, the issue
of who is right is not as clear-cut in a racial demonstration as it
might be in, say, a panty raid on campus. In other words, college
students who are adults or almost adults may be entitled to debate
the power of the school officials to inhibit their participation in
activities of which the officials disapprove. On the other hand, the
matter of the propriety of student conduct obviously cannot be left
entirely in the hands of the students themselves, and there are unquestionably many areas of behavior the control of which is the
proper province of college authorities. A timely expression of the
policy of the state would be to the effect that state college and university authorities have the power to formulate and enforce rules of
student conduct which are appropriate and necessary to the maintenance of order and propriety, considering the accepted norms of
social behavior in the community; but that no rules may be imposed
which place restrictions on student conduct which are not reasonably
necessary in furthering the school's educational goals, or which unduly
restrict the freedom of students to express themselves on matters of
genuine social and moral significance. Such broad language would of
course require interpretation in relation to specific fact situations,
but in every instance the college would conduct the initial proceedings as to the propriety of its rules within its own administrative
structure. Only when the college had rendered its decision, finally
and adversely, would the student be entitled to seek review in the
courts.
Having established the substantive standard for college regulations
31. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., supra note 2; Knight v. State Bd. of
Educ., supra note 2. But see Due v. Florida A & M Univ., supra note 4, where the
court upheld a dismissal from school which grew out of a criminal contempt conviction brought about by the student's participation in racial demonstrations. The court
held that there had been an adequate hearing by the college.
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of student conduct, the statute should then outline the minimum
procedural standard for enforcement of the rules. Generally, a college
or university should be required to grant a reasonable hearing to
students accused of -violations for which expulsion or prolonged
suspension is a possible penalty. This requirement would apply only
to cases of alleged misconduct and not to cases of failure to meet
academic standards, because the latter are peculiarly within the
professional competence of the educator. The degree of notoriety of
the misconduct, the seriousness of the act or acts complained of,
including whether a violation of city ordinance, or state, or federal
law is involved, the manner in which the misconduct was brought
to the attention of the school, and whether the student has admitted
or denied the violation, would be factors to be considered in determining what type of hearing is in order. In a case in which a student
has been found guilty of a felony in a court of law, only a very
cursory hearing to confirm the identity of the offender, if any,
would be required. On the other hand, in the typical case in which a
student is accused by a fellow student or by a teacher of cheating
on an examination, or of some other breach of the college honor code,
a more formal hearing, including a statement of the charges against
the accused, the names of at least the primary witnesses against him,
and an opportunity to produce witnesses in his own behalf would
seem to be minimal requirements. The statute should therefore distinguish between those cases in which the guilt of the student must
be established by a reasonable process of fact-finding within the
college administration (including whatever student court or council
may be organized for the purpose of hearing such matters), 32 and
those cases in which his guilt has already been established, either
by his own admission or by a court of law.
A student who has suffered an adverse decision by college authorities would, under the suggested statute, be allowed to petition a court
of general jurisdiction for review. The statute should provide that
no petition for review will be received by a court unless the student
shall have suffered an adverse decision by the highest authority
within the administration of the school empowered to make such
decisions.3 Furthermore, punishment short of expulsion or pro32. Many colleges and universities have rather elaborate honor codes and procedures
for their enforcement. The student council is frequently an integral part of the
disciplinary system, and the proposed statute envisions no alteration in this regard.
On the propriety of the administration of discipline by student groups, see In re
Carter, supra note 5.
33. See note 32 supra. The obvious purpose of such a provision would be to prevent
students from bringing their cases into the courts prematurely. The procedures normally
followed by the particular school would determine when a decision had reached the
highest level of consideration and had become final.
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tracted suspension should not normally be reviewable in the courts.
It is suggested that suspension for one or more terms 34 should enable
the student to proceed under the statute. Of course, if cases arose in
which the college administration deliberately sought to evade the
working of the statute by refusing to render a "final" decision, while
at the same time keeping the student from attending classes, the
court could intervene upon proper petition by the student and order
the school to conclude its processes. Since a disciplinary proceeding
before college authorities or before a student council can be assumed
to produce some degree of intimidation or anxiety in the mind of
the accused, the statute should require the school to permit him to
be accompanied by legal counsel or by a lay adviser if he so chooses.
There should be, however, a proviso that the normal rules of procedure of the disciplinary body will at all times prevail.
The primary inquiry of the reviewing court would be directed to
the adequacy of the hearing afforded by the college authorities and
the propriety of the regulation; and only in those cases in which the
adverse decision of the college is unsupported by a proper hearing,
or is based on a regulation beyond the power of the school to enforce,
would the court reverse the decision of the college with an order for
a new hearing or revocation or modification of the regulation at issue.
Only in cases in which the college disciplinary authorities manifestly
acted in bad faith would the court take the case from them and decide
the question of the student's guilt on its merits. In any case in which
the court saw fit to order another hearing at the college level, it
could include such instructions for the guidance of the hearing
authorities as it saw fit, short of ordering a specific conclusion. Any
tendency toward harassment of school officials by disgruntled students
with frivolous claims could be discouraged by a provision that the
petitioner will be held liable for full costs, including attorneys' fees,
in the event that judgment is given for the school and the court
further finds that the student did not have reasonable cause for
bringing the action. Flexibility in the administration of the statute
could probably best be achieved by viewing proceedings instituted
thereunder as equitable in nature. The typical remedy would therefore be injunction.
It cannot be denied that the procedure outlined herein would
probably lead to an increase in the number of college discipline cases
brought before the courts. This probability, standing alone, should
not be a serious deterrent to its adoption, particularly in view of the
fact that the statute would tend to discourage all frivolous appeals.
College authorities do not characteristically act arbitrarily or in bad
34. Terms would normally be either quarters or semesters.
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faith when dealing with their students, and this suggested legislation
does not assume that they do. But, with the tremendous increase in
enrollments in institutions of higher learning, with the corresponding
increase in the inability of college authorities to know students individually, and with the transcendent importance which the typical
student must be assumed to place upon his opportunity to complete
his college program,35 arbitrariness or bad faith should no longer be
the prerequisites to judicial review of college discipline. As the court
in Dixon has held, due process requires that students be accorded a
reasonable hearing and given the benefit of objective ascertainment
of guilt prior to being subjected to the extreme penalties of expulsion
or prolonged suspension.
PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE
I. The administrative officers3 6 of colleges and universities which receive
37
their principal support from the legislature of this state shall have the
to
student conduct
pertaining
regulations
enforce
all
power to make and
which are appropriate and necessary to the maintenance of order, discipline, and propriety at such colleges and universities, considering the
normal standards of behavior within the local community; provided,
however, that no regulation may be enforced which exceeds the reasonable interest of the school in furthering its educational goals, or which
unduly restricts the freedom of students to express themselves on
matters of genuine social and moral significance.
35. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., supra note 2, at 157, "It is most
unlikely that a public college would accept a student expelled from another public
college of the same state. Indeed, expulsion may well prejudice the student in
completing his education at any other institution."
36. It is acknowledged that the regulatory power may be vested in a board of
education, a board of trustees, or in other agencies. "Administrative officers" is used
generically for the purposes of the model statute.
37. This clause is not intended to contain an exclusive definition of the "state" college.
The language is primarily descriptive, and is thought to be adequate to differentiate
between the tax-supported institution and the "private" school, at least for the purposes
of the model statute. A consideration of the statute's coverage inevitably raises questions
as to how far the state can or should go in controlling the enforcement of regulations
in so-called private institutions. See notes 11, 12, 13, and 18 supra. It has not been
the purpose here to give searching treatment to this question, but this much should
be said. The tendency of the courts to refrain from reviewing the disciplinary
decisions of private schools on the ground that the private college-student relationship
rests entirely in contract probably oversimplifies the problem. This is particularly so
in cases where the "private" school is actually receiving some governmental financial
aid, because in such cases there may well be sufficient "state action" involved to bring
the institution within the scope of the due process requirements of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Moreover, the fact that even "private"
colleges and universities are performing what is basically a public function in the
education of the nation's youth would seem to render them subject to reasonable
requirements of procedural due process when they cause a student to be expelled for
misconduct. See in this connection Guillory v. Adm'rs of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp.
855 (E.D. La. 1962), rev'd. on rehearing,212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962); Johnson,
The Constitutional Rights of College Students, 42 TxxAs L. Bzv. 344-49 (1964).
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II. When any student at any college or university described in Part I
has been accused of violating a regulation of such college or university,
for which violation he may be punished by expulsion or suspension
for as long as one school term,38 he shall be entitled to the protection
hereinafter provided:
A. In cases in which the guilt of the student has been established by
his own voluntary admission or by conviction in a court of justice
in the county where the college or university is located, of an
offense which clearly amounts to a violation of the regulations of the
college or university, the student may be subjected to suspension or
expulsion, or lesser punishment, in the discretion of the disciplinary
body,39 upon the delivery to the student of notice in writing of
the action to be taken. In such case, the student need not be
accorded a hearing unless it is necessary to establish his identity
as the convicted offender or to confirm the voluntary nature of his
admission of guilt.
B. In cases in which the guilt of the student has not been established
under the provisions of the preceding paragraph: (1) He shall be
entitled to a hearing before the disciplinary body of the college or
university. (2) He shall be further entitled to receive a statement
in writing, at least two days prior to the hearing, setting forth the
charges against him with sufficient clarity to enable him to present
a reasonable defense thereto. (3) He shall be further entitled to
know the names of the witnesses who are directly responsible for
having reported the alleged violation to the disciplinary body, or if
there be no such witnesses, to be fully informed of the manner in
which the alleged violation came to their attention. (4) He shall
be further entitled to present his defense to the disciplinary body
while the members are assembled for hearing, including the presentation by him of a reasonable number of witnesses in his own behalf.
(5) He shall be further entitled, if he so chooses, to be accompanied
and represented by legal counsel or by a lay adviser; provided, however, that in all hearings before the disciplinary body; the normal
rules of procedure of said body shall be observed.- (6) He shall be
further entitled to expeditious handling of his case and prompt
decision after the hearing, consistent with the requirements of
mature and careful reflection by the disciplinary body upon the
charges and the defenses raised thereto. (7) He shall be further
entitled to an explicit explanation in writing of the basis for any
decision rendered against him.
III. A. Any student of any college or university described in Part I who
has been expelled or suspended for as long as one school term on the
ground that he is guilty of misconduct in violation of the regulations
of the college or university, may, if the expulsion or suspension be
ordered pursuant to a final decision by the highest disciplinary
officer or body of the college or university that is empowered to
make such decisions, 40 petition any court of general equity jurisdic38. See note 34 supra.
39. See note 32 supra.
40. See note 33 supra.
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tion in the county where the college or university is located for
review of the decision; provided, however, that such petitions must
contain allegations that the decision of which he seeks review
was rendered contrary to the provisions of Part I or of Part II of this
Act, or of both, or that the action taken against him
by the college
4
or university was taken arbitrarily or in bad faith. 1
B. Upon receipt by a proper court of a petition duly submitted
pursuant to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, said court
shall examine the facts and shall make a determination as to the
merits of the allegations contained in the petition. Upon a finding
that the allegations are without merit, the court shall dismiss the
petition. Upon a finding that the allegations are meritorious, the
court shall order a new hearing, or a revocation, or a modification
of the regulations in issue, or, upon a finding of arbitrary conduct
or bad faith by any party before the court, shall render whatever
judgment is required by principles of equity.
C. Any student who seeks review of any decision of any college or
university in a court of this state shall be fully responsible for all
costs incurred by the college or university in defending the action,
including all attorneys' fees, in any case in which judgment shall
ultimately be in favor of the respondent college or university and
the court shall find that the student did not have reasonable grounds
for bringing the suit.

Enforcement of Foreign Non-Final Alimony Decrees
At the end of a divorce proceeding friction between the parties
is common. Consequently the husband often tries to avoid paying

alimony or support by leaving the
This not only imposes hardships
creates a problem in which society
morally and practically, for if the

state where his family resides.
on the abandoned family but
has a paramount interest, both
husband does not support the

family the state must do so.1 Even if the missing spouse can be found,
the wife faces very difficult legal obstacles to the enforcement of her

alimony decree. The purpose of this brief discussion is to examine
the interstate problems involved in enforcing decrees for alimony or

support, to point out the developments and advances, and to propose
a uniform solution.
41. This provision provides a desirable restriction upon the scope of review. Under
most circumstances, the court will be required to look only to the sufficiency of the
hearing, but the student is also protected against the possibility of there being improper

regulations or other unfair action by the school.

1. In 1949 the total bill for aid to dependents where the father was absent and not
supporting was $205,000,000.
SuPpoarT at v

(1960).

BROCKELBANK,

INTEnSTATE ENFORCENENT OF FAMILY

LEGISLATION
THE PROBLEM

While the Constitution of the United States calls for the courts
of the several states to give "Full Faith and Credit... to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State," 2 the
long established procedure for enforcing money judgments of sister
states is to bring a new action in F-2 based upon the F-i judgment.3
Even though the F-1 judgment is conclusive upon the merits 4 and
subject to very limited grounds of attack, this method is at best expensive and lengthy. At worst it is likely to result in a warning to the
judgment debtor by which he may dispose of his assets and deprive
the judgment creditor of his effective remedy.5 Undesirable as this
procedure is for the enforcement of foreign money judgments in
general, it is little better than none at all for enforcing alimony
decrees in particular. 6 It is the practice in most American jurisdictions for the court to reserve the power to modify alimony and support
orders upon the showing of good cause by either party.7 This power
generally extends not only to the payment of future installments but
to amounts which may have accrued and remain unpaid. Decrees
subject to this power are normally termed non-final orders.8 In
1909 the Supreme Court ruled that decrees for the payment of alimony
in future installments are protected by full faith and credit only
as to those payments which are overdue and not subject to the
discretion of the rendering court.9 The rationale is that F-1 money
judgments are enforcible in F-2 only by an action of debt upon the
F-1 judgment, but, since an action of debt is upon a sum due and
certain, as long as the amount due under the decree is modifiable
it may not be the subject of a new action in F-2.1' The result is that
2. U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
3. As has become customary in articles dealing with the conflict of law, the court
rendering the decree will be designated hereafter as F-1 and the state where enforcement is sought as F-2.
4. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 169 (1839).

5. Paulsen, Enforcing the Money Judgment of a Sister State, 42 IowA L. Rnv. 202
(1957).
6. The term foreign money judgments is used here only as it applies to the enforcement of sister state judgments and not to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the
strict international sense.
7. This is normally done by statute but may be expressly reserved in the decree.
MADDEN, PERSONS Am DOMESTIC B.ELAT[ONS, §§ 97-98, at 328 (1931).

8. The only final alimony or support orders are those which call for a lump sum
payment. Since there is no difficulty involved in enforcing such decrees, this article
is not concerned with them and when alimony or support is mentioned it is the
non-final category which is intended.
9. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).

10. Page, Full Faith and Credit: The Discarded Constitutional Provision. 1948 Wis.
L. REv. 265; Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law,
33 Mici. L. Rnv. 1129 (1935).
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even a non-modifiable decree is enforcible only as to overdue amounts.
If accrued installments are modifiable, then the wife must reduce the
amount to judgment in F-1 and then bring an action in F-2 based upon
this final judgment." But of what good is this to a wife who needs
the money to maintain herself and her family. Very few alimony
awards are sufficient to bear the expense of two legal actions and
leave anything for the wife. For example, a relatively recent case
involved an alimony decree of only nine dollars per week.12 Add to
this the fact that the same procedure must be followed every time she
wishes to collect unpaid installments and it is easy to see why a wife
would be unable to pursue her remedy. This creates an anomalous
situation-the law imposes a duty of support upon a husband and
then renders it ineffectual by procedural niceties!
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Several different possibilities for alleviating the harshness of the
existing method have been proposed and some have been utilized.
For example, one state has chosen to allow accrued but modifiable
installments to be the basis of a new action, reasoning that such a
decree is entitled to full faith and credit until an application for modification is made. 13 This does not, however, eliminate the necessity of
bringing a new suit every time installments become due. A very few
courts have gone so far as to turn the F-i judgment into a local judgment by issuing a local continuing order. 14 Such an order takes all the
terms of the F-1 judgment and makes them effective in F-2. The
advantages of this are obvious for not only is the decree enforced
as to both past due and future installments, but the special local
equitable remedies for the enforcement of alimony decrees, which
are lost if enforcement is only by an action of debt, are also available."
There have been two legislative proposals by the Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws which would be significant
advances in the enforcement of alimony decrees. The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgements Act was drafted to eliminate the
11. An excellent discussion of all the possibilities is set out in Jacobs, The Enforcement of Foreign Decrees for Alimony, 6 LAw & CoNTEhP. Pnon. 250 (1939).
12. Worthley v. Wortley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955).
13. Holten v. Holten, 153 Minn. 346, 190 N.W. 542 (1922).
14. Worthley v. Worthley, supra note 12; Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So. 2d 292 (Fla.

1950); Cousineau v. Cousineau, 155 Ore. 184, 63 P.2d 897 (1936); MeKeel v.
McKeel, 185 Va. 108, 37 S.E.2d 746 (1946). These cases were decided on the basis
of comity and not full faith and credit. One court has held that full faith and credit
required the enforcement of alimony decrees. Fanchier v. Gamill, 148 Miss. 723, 114
So. 813 (1927).
15. Scoles, Enforcement of Foreign "Non-Final" Alimony And Support Orders, 53
COLum. L. RFv. 817 (1953).
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necessity of bringing an action in F-2.16 It provides a registration and
summary judgment procedure whereby the F-i judgment upon registration becomes an F-2 judgment and is entitled to be enforced in
the same manner as F-2 judgments. If non-final alimony decrees
could be registered under this act the result would be the same
as has been accomplished by issuing a local continuing order. Unfortunately the act provides for the registration of only those judgments
17
which are entitled to full faith and credit and under the Sistare
rule non-final alimony decrees are not."' A second uniform act expressly calls for the registration of foreign support orders. The
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act says that foreign
support orders may be registered in a state where enforcement is
sought and will be the basis of a duty to support. 19 The enforcing
state will not only enforce the decree for future payments but will
also hear pleas for modification. Presently fourteen states have
adopted this act in its amended form which includes the registration
provisions, yet the act has seemingly not been used to enforce alimony
or support order. No state appellate court has yet been called on to
construe the section. 0 The act thus remains an unused reservoir of
possibilities.
Even if an ideal uniform act were proposed which cured all the
defects in the enforcement of foreign alimony judgments, it would
remain subject to the fundamental disability of all other uniform
acts, that is, it must be adopted by the states. In view of the
approach taken by the states in the past, it seems unwarranted
optimism to suspect that such an act would be widely adopted. The
best solution is a federal statute calling for enforcement by registration of all foreign money judgments. Such statutes are now in effect
in England, 21 Australia 2 and even govern the method of enforcement
among federal courts in the United States.23 That Congress has the
constitutional power to provide for such a uniform system of registration is manifest.24 Part of the full faith and credit clause provides that
"Congress may by general law prescribe the manner in which such
16. See Leflar, The New Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, 24 N.Y.U.L. REv. 336
(1949).
17. Supra note 9.
18. Supra note 16, at 349.
19. BRocx _.BAx, op. cit. supra note 1, at 94 (1960).
20. Id. at 69-77. An examination of the digests revealed no cases involving the use
of this section of the act.
21. Administration of Justice Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 81, pt. II.
22. Service and Execution of Process Act, 1901-1934 (2 Commonwealth Acts 1415)
(1901-1935).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1958).
24. Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE
L.J. 421 (1919); Yntema, supra note 10.
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Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved and the effect thereof." 25 So far the only exercise of this authority as applied to judg-

ments was in 179026 in an act which has been interpreted and followed as giving the conclusive effect to foreign judgments that they
enjoy today, but not expanding the common law method of enforcement by bringing a new action.27
Conceding that Congress has the authority to provide for a system
of registration, are there any constitutional or practical barriers to
the inclusion of alimony decrees among those money judgments
which may be registered? In Barber v. Barber, Mr. Justice Jackson
speaking in support of the enforcement of alimony decrees said:
Neither the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution nor the Act of
Congress implementing it says anything about final judgments. .

.

. Both

require that full faith and credit be given to "judicial proceedings" without
limitation as to finality. Upon recognition of the broad meaning of that term
much may some day depend.28

Certainly alimony and support decrees are judicial proceedings and

are entitled under full faith and credit to the same treatment as other
money judgments. The principle reason that money judgments are
required to be final is that enforcement has traditionally been by the
common law action of debt in F-2. If the method is changed and
enforcement is no longer by an action of debt then what little basis
there may be for requiring "finality" disappears.29 The only concern
for finality should be on the merits of the case. As long as the rights
of the parties have been finally adjudicated and the decision has become final by the exhaustion of rights of appeal, there should be no
insurmountable obstacles to enforcement by registration. Alimony
decrees are as final under the circumstances as they can possibly be.
Retaining the power to modify the decree is a unique and desirable
way of keeping the interests of the party in harmony. Such flexibility should not be defeated unnecessarily.
Somewhat more complex than "finality" is the practical matter of
the "effect" of judgments in sister states. In the event there is a
conflict of law between F-1 and F-2 regarding enforcement of judgment procedures, just which law should F-2 be required to apply?
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
26. The act was re-enacted in 1948 in its present form which is no different from
the 1790 act as far as enforcement of judgments is concerned. 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1958).
27. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 169 (1839).
28. 323 U.S. 77, 87 (1944) (concurring opinion).
29. Obviously courts could not be required to enforce judgments where it was
impossible to determine the amount due, but that is far from the case with alimony
decrees where there is always a readily ascertainable sum due.
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This question is obviously basic to the whole problem of enforcing
foreign money judgments but has even more significance for non-final
alimony decrees. Almost universally the answer has been that F-2
need only treat F-1 judgments in the same fashion as similar F-2
judgments would be treated. This is the result in the English 3 and
Australian 3' registration statutes and the same recommendation is
made in the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,2 the
statute suggested by Professor Cook 33 and the statute governing registration among federal courts.3 4 It is submitted that this is a rational
solution and is consonant with the proper purposes of full faith and
credit-to put F-1 judgments on equal footing with judgments of F-2.
The purpose is to eliminate discrimination and this is achieved by
making the F-i judgment, in effect, a judgment of F-2. An appropriate analogy is the privileges and immunities clause, which says
that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to the privileges and
immunities of the citizens of the several states." 35 To say that F-2
must apply the law of F-1 would create a source of confusion and
would do much to destroy the advantages gained by a registration
system. At this point it should be noted that a literal reading of the
1790 act seems to reach the opposite conclusion. That statute provides that judgments "shall have such faith and credit given to them
in every court within the United States as they have by law and
usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken."36 However, as shown previously, the Supreme Court said that this act
provided merely for the conclusive effect of judgments and did not
include enforcement procedures.3 7 This interpretation has gone unchallenged and Congress has shown an acceptance of it by providing
that registered federal judgments shall have the effect and be enforced
in the manner of judgments of the registering state.1 A federal
statute providing for the registration of state judgments should have
similar provisions. In the case of alimony or support orders this
would mean that in F-2 only those equitable remedies and grounds
for modification available for F-2 decrees would necessarily be available for F-1 judgments. Perhaps some inequities will result from this
and one party or the other will gain an advantage when F-2 law is
30. Administration of Justice Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 81, pt. II.
31. Service and Execution of Process Act, 1901-1934 (2 Commonwealth Acts 1415)

(1901-1935).

32. UNwonr

m ENFoncEmr'r OF FOREiGN JUDGMENTS AcT
33. Cook, supra note 24, at 427.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1958).
35. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2.
36. 28 U.S.C. 1738 (1958).
37. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 169 (1839).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1958).

§ 7 (1948).
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different, but the similarity in the state laws concerning alimony is so
great that any occasional advantage will be slight.
Dealing finally with modification it should be remembered that this
statute sets out only what full faith and credit requires F-2 to do
with F-1 judgments. It in no way affects what F-i may do with a
decree of her making. Thus F-1 may choose to modify the decree
upon grounds available either in F-1 or F-2. Furthermore, while F-2
is required to apply the grounds of modification available to its own
decrees there is no prohibition against the use of other grounds if
the court feels that an injustice is being done. Any modification of
the decree by either court, after notice and opportunity for hearing,
would then be entitled to full faith and credit just as any other
judgment.
Since the enforcement of foreign alimony or support orders is only
a part of a broader problem, the legislative proposal here submitted
provides first for a procedure for enforcing all foreign money judgments. It then deals with the procedural problems which might arise
with alimony or support decrees.
PROPOSED STATUTE

(A) A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property entered
in the court of any state which has become final upon appeal
or expiration of time for appeal or other condition precedent for
finality may be registered in any other state by filing a certified copy
of the judgment in a court of same or similar jurisdiction as that of
the originating court and if there is no such court then in a court of
general civil jurisdiction of the state where registered. A judgment
so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of a state court
of the state where registered and may be enforced in like manner
from the moment of registration even though there be a period for
the interposing of available defenses hereinafter set out.
(B) A notice summons clearly designating the foreign judgment and
reciting the fact of registration, the court in which it is registered, and
the time allowed for pleading, shall be sent by the clerk of the registering court via registered mail with return receipt, to the last known
address of the judgment debtor. The clerk shall enter on the record
the fact that the notice summons has been sent in the manner here
stated and shall similarly make an entry on the return of the receipt.
(C) Any defense, which under the law of the state where registered
may be asserted by the defendant in an action on the foreign judgment,
may be presented by appropriate pleadings within sixty (60) days
and the issues raised thereby shall be tried and determined as in other
civil actions.
(D) The amount due on the judgment in the state of origin shall be
increased by the cost of registration according to a schedule prescribed
by the registering state.
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(E) Judgment within the meaning of this statute shall include any
decree or order for alimony or support which is enforceable in the
state of rendition, even though modifiable in that state.39
(1) Petition for the registration of an alimony or support order shall
set forth the amount remaining unpaid and a list of any other
states in which the order is registered.
(2) Upon registration of a certified copy of any modification whether
by the court which rendered the original decree or by a court
where the decree is registered and after due notice to the judgment debtor of time for pleading and opportunity to be heard as
set out above, the modification will be given the same effect as
the original decree.
(3) At any time during the time allowed for pleading or subsequent
thereto, the registering court may upon petition entertain pleas
for modifications and may modify the decree by decreasing or
otherwise modifying the amount to be paid under
enlarging or
40
the decree.

Legal Aid for Indigent Criminal Defendants
It is the nature of man to seek justice, and the basic purpose of any
good legal system is to provide it. One of the characteristics that has
ennobled this nation and made it great is our insistence upon making
justice equal and accessible for all. 1

I. THE PRoBLEM
The base point in evaluating the methods presently employed by
the states in providing legal assistance to indigent criminal defendants
is that due process requires that the indigent have competent counsel
for his defense. The question today is no longer whether the states
shall address themselves to the defense of the indigent; that decision
has been made.2 The Supreme Court, in Gideon v. Wainwright,3
39. This part of the statute is substantially the same as one published in 17 VAND.
L. REv. 652, 657 (1964), which is modeled on the federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1963
(1958).
40. The ideas embodied here were partially taken from the UNnwoaRm RECIPocAL
ElNFOnCEMENT OF SUPPoRT AcT § 34 (1958).
1. Letter from Chief Justice of the United States, Earl Warren, to Orison S. Marden,
President, National Legal Aid Association, October 10, 1956, reprinted in 15 Ti
LEGAL Am BaRtF CAsE 27 (1956).
2. It was not until 1938 that the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 30 U.S. 458
(1938), interpreted the sixth amendment to mean that a defendant in a federal court
is entitled not only to be represented by his retained counsel, but that he is entitled
to have counsel assigned, if he is unable to obtain representation. As recently as
1942 the Court, in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), held that due process does
not require a state to furnish counsel to a defendant in every criminal case, but only
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recognized as essential to a fair trial the right of an indigent in a
criminal trial to have the assistance of counsel. Mere recognition
of this right, however, is illusory, unless accompanied by effective
methods to assure its fulfillment. It is necessary to adopt means which
comply with the qualitative requirements demanded by equal justice.
There is little need to expound: if the indigent is to receive the same
justice as the affluent, he must have as competent legal assistance as
the malefactor of means. The problem is how to provide competent
counsel for all indigent criminal defendants.
While solution to this problem would have been difficult at any
stage in the country's development, it is particularly difficult today.
The explosive expansion of the nation's population, industrial development, urbanization and the complexity and fluidity of economic
and social institutions have created exceptional problems in the administration of criminal justice. There has been an enormous increase
in criminal offenses with a correlative increase in the need for counsel.
It is estimated that over two million people are charged with a
major criminal offense each year. One million of those arrested need
free legal assistance. 4 While progress has been made toward providing the needed assistance,5 the fact remains that each year thousands of indigent criminal defendants receive only cursory representation by court appointed counsel, who are neither compensated for
their services, nor reimbursed for expenses. Privately supported
defender associations exist in relatively few communities and provide
only limited coverage. 6 Only seventy-eight public defender offices
are in existence, and of this number sixty-three are located in three
states.7 How can the demand for legal representation be effectively
satisfied? Can adequate representation be provided indigent defendants by the traditional assigned counsel system? Or is it necessary
when the facts are such that to proceed without counsel would be fundamentally
unfair. Since 1948, the Court has extended its interpretation of the right of representation in a state court. See, e.g., Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960);
Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Wade
v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948). The most recent decision is the now famous Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), discussed in the text. For the complete historio
development of the right to the Assistance of Counsel see BEANEv, Tm MGoT TO
CoUNsEL iN AMmICAN CouRTs (1955); Becker & Heidelbough, The Right to Counsel in
Criminal Cases, 28 NoTE DAzME LA-w. 351 (1953).
3. Supra note 2; 16 VAND. L. Rnv. 1228 (1963).

4. Pollock, Equal Justice in Practice,45 MINN. L. Rlv. 737, 738-39 (1961).
5. For the growth of systems to afford representation to indigent defendants see,
A SPEcIAL CO MITTEE OF THE AssocLinoN OF THE BARI OF THE CrTY OF NEw Yonx
N THE NATIONAL LEGAL Anm AND DEFENDER AssOCIATION, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR TlE
AccusED 43-47 (1959) [hereinafter cited as EQUAL JusTIcE]. See also BIIOWNELL,
LEGAL AI IN THE UNITED STATES (1951).
6. Supra note 4, at 738.
7. California, Connecticut, and Illinois.
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to increase reliance on innovations such as the private legal aid
society and the public defender? Or is it time to institute newly
devised methods?
II. POSSMBLE SOLUTIONS
Though the problem is apparent, the selection and implementation
of the system most appropriately designed to provide effective representation to indigent criminal defendants requires more than casual
reflection. Even the most informed authorities disagree. There are
those who advocate the privately supported defender system, or, in
the alternative, the assigned counsel system, if counsel is compensated,
but feel that the public defender system is ill-conceived. 8 At the
opposite extreme, there are those who feel the public defender system
is the ultimate solution of the problem.9 The following discussion
evaluates the variety of methods presently employed in providing
legal assistance to the poor. It begins with the private methods,
moves to the public method, and concludes with the mixed publicprivate method. In evaluating these methods, it is necessary to
establish a standard by which to measure the effectiveness of the
system. Any system that is adopted must provide capable, experienced, and loyal representation for every indigent faced with a
criminal prosecution; representation at an early stage in the proceedings and on appeal; and representation aided by adequate investigatory opportunities. 10
A. Assigned Counsel
The method most frequently employed is the assigned counsel
system, characterized by a case by case approach with the presiding
judge appointing counsel to serve without compensation. Typically,
younger attorneys who are willing and able to devote time to assigned
cases are appointed." In some jurisdictions there is a systematic
technique of assignment under which counsel is assigned in alphabetical rotation.'2 The assigned counsel system was developed at a
time when America was characterized by a homogeneous population
living in rural areas. Communities were smaller, more stable, more
conducive to personal relationships, and often the defendant was
8. Dimmock, The Public Defender: A Step Towards a Police State? 42 A.B.A.J.
219 (1956).
9. Celler, New Hopes for Federal Public Defender Legislation, 19 LEGAL Am BFm
CASE 28 (1961); Cuff, Public Defender System: The Los Angeles Story, 45 MmN. L.
REV. 715 (1961); David, Institutionalor Private Counsel: A Judge's View of the Public
Defender System, 45 Mmis. L. REV. 753 (1961).
10. EQUAL JUSTICE 26.

11. Id. at 48. See also FELLmAN, THE DEFENDANT's
12. EQUAL JUST-CE 49.

icHTs 125 (1958).
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known by the appointed counsel. With the courthouse the center of
community attraction, the ambitious attorney was eager to accept
assignment so as to demonstrate his skill. The office of the prosecutor
was not specialized and, against the general practitioner, turned
prosecuting attorney for the trial, the assigned counsel could compete
on equal terms. The greatest factor contributing to the early success
of the assigned counsel system was the relative infrequency of criminal prosecution, thus precluding the assigned attorney from assuming
a burden of frequent or extended appearances. 3 However, inherent
in the assigned counsel system is an inability to provide the scope
of representation required in our complex metropolitan communities. 4
Another serious defect is the inability of the system to afford representation that is uniformly competent, experienced, zealous, and
loyal.'5 The assumption that all lawyers are qualified to practice
criminal law is erroneous. 16 While it may be true that criminal law
concepts are familiar to most attorneys, there is a premium on detailed knowledge of applicable statutes, procedures, police techniques,
and the workings of criminal labs. 7 Many lawyers in modern practice
have little or no interest in criminal law and consequently are
inadequately qualified to represent persons charged with crime. The
reputable, experienced lawyer is seldom able to devote full time and
energy to the assigned defendant. 8 It is not a solution to depend
upon young attorneys whose time is less in demand, for, regardless
of the zeal of a young lawyer, he is seldom a match for the experienced district attorney.' 9 Though th'eoretically the assigned counsel system is able to come into operation at an early stage of the
proceedings, in practice the appointment may not be made until
the defendant is arraigned. 20 Thus the advantage of timeliness is lost.
Further, as a practical matter, the representation assigned ends at
the conclusion of the proceedings in the trial court, 21 though this

factor, as well, is not an inherent weakness. With the burden of the
defense on a practicing counsel, seldom does the defense acquire
the completeness derived from utilization of all investigatory facilities. 22 This is particularly true when there are no provisions for
13. BRowNELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 136.

14. EQUAL JUSTICE 63.
15. Id. at 64.
16. Id. at 65.
17. David, supra note 9, at 756, 736.
18. Even the call of professional responsibility cannot obscure the fact that a
lawyer's stock and trade is time. It is unfair to place the burden of care for the poor
on any group who earn their living by their work.
19. BRowNEaLL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 143, and Cuff, supra note 9, at 723.
20. EQUAL JusTicE 67.
21. Ibid.
22. Id. at 66.
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reimbursement of expenses, or when the counsel is a youthful attorney
unable to expend personal money. Though the assigned counsel
system in theory calls upon the best tradition of the legal profession
and at times provides distinguished and effective services, in most
areas the system now needs to be replaced by a means capable of
supplying the demands of a complex society. It is recommended that
in communities exceeding fifty thousand population, consideration
be given to the adoption of other means to protect the indigent
defendant. In those areas where the system can effectively be retained, it is suggested that compensation for the service of the
assigned counsel and reimbursement for expenses incurred would
improve the quality and effectiveness of the system.23
B. Voluntary Defender
A voluntary defender system has as its basis a private, non-governmental organization characterized by a centralized, professional approach to the representation of the indigent defendant. Unlike the
ad hoc method of the assigned counsel system, the voluntary defender
system creates a law office to which the court assigns representation
of indigent defendants. The system employs a trained, salaried staff,
but may also rely on the assistance of private law offices or local
law students. 24 The office is privately controlled and financially supported by independent efforts to secure charitable contributions. In
practice, a voluntary defender system with sufficient personnel and
funds can provide the breadth of representation required to meet
the qualitative standard of equal justice.25 Also, contingent upon
sufficient funds, there is no reason why the system cannot establish
the required investigatory facilities necessary to present a complete
defense.2 The centralized office approach affords a continuity of
qualified representation with the experience of the veteran defenders
passed to the younger staff members.2 However, while it is true
that the system has highly qualified specialists at the top of the
23. It is suggested that the federal Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006a

(Supp. 1964), might serve as a guide. The act provides for compensation at the rate
of $15 per hour for time expended in court, and $10 per hour for time reasonably
expended out of court, and for reimbursement of reasonable expenses incurred. This
is limited to a maximum of $500 for a felony, and $300 for a misdemeanor.
24. EQUAL JUsTcE 50-51. Boston makes significant use of law students. The Harvard

Voluntary Defenders Committee composed of 26 second and third year students performs practically all initial jail interviews and the bulk of investigatory work. In
Philadelphia each month one of the large firms supplies the full time services of one
of its junior attorneys. Law students from the local law schools perform interviewing
and investigating tasks.
25. Id. at 68-70. See also Pollock, supra note 4, at 745.
26. EQuAL JusTIcE 70-71.
27. Id. at 70.
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organization, all too often the brunt- of the work is assumed 'by
young attorneys who are beginning their careers and seek only a
temporary position.2 As previously noted, a new lawyer is often
unable to meet an experienced prosecutor on equal terms. However,
since the system uses an established organization, it is capable of
initiating representation at an early stage and equally capable of
continuing the proceedings to an appropriate conclusion. The most
crippling defect of the system is its dependency on voluntary contributions.2 9 The uncertainty and inadequacy of revenue is a practical
limitation on the operation of the system, but if the necessary
pecuniary support is forthcoming, the voluntary defender system
can adequately meet the demands of equal justice.
C. Public Defender
The public defender, like the prosecutor, is a government official
employed to fulfill the state's obligation of equal protection before
the law regardless of economic status. The public defender's office
is staffed by various means: civil service, appointment, or election. 30
This results in stability and continuity and frequently with career
service developments. The system is financed by public monies: in
some instances by budgetary appropriations and in others by fixed fee
retainer.31 Advocates of the public defender concept urge "that the
presumption of innocence requires the state to defend as well as
prosecute .

. . ."-

They urge that the accused should not be de-

pendent upon charity for an adequate defense, but "should be represented by a sworn public official who has the duty, as well as the
33
power and standing, fully to protect the interest of the accused."
The initial charge against the public defender system was that it was
a step toward a police state by socialization of the bar.34 Such a
conception of the public defender is ill-conceived unless socialism
includes every governmental office established to discharge a community responsibility. Implicit in the misconception is the failure
to realize that the system grew out of a need to protect the individual
28. Cuff, supra note 9, at 725.
29. EQUAL JusTIcE 69-70.
30. Id. at 52. In two counties in California the public defenders are selected on the
basis of competitive civil service examination. The public defenders in Connecticut
are appointed by the judge of the superior court. Election by popular vote occurs in
Omaha and San Francisco.
31. Id. at 51. Most public defenders submit, a yearly budget request to a local
governing body. In Connecticut, funds for all public defenders are originally appropriated by the Connecticut Legislature to the Judicial Department of the State which
then provides for payments to the individual defender.
32. Cuff, supra note 9, at 721.
33. Id. at 726.
34. Supra note 8.
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against the state. In practice, while the public defender system has
continued to spread in use, the bar has retained its independence. 35
The most common criticism today arises from the fear of potential
political direction of the system. In communities controlled by a
powerful political organization appointments and even elections may
result in the public defender office serving a function not intended
when inaugurated. In addition to this argument, the system's opponents assert that even in the absence of political domination, the
system will not protect the rights of the publicly unpopular defendant,06 e.g., cop-beater, rapist, embezzler of tax funds, etc. These
criticisms do not strike at an inherent weakness in the system. There
is no reason why a public defender should not be as conscientious
and devoted a public servant as the prosecutor whom he opposes or
the judge before whom he appears, both of whom are public officials.
There are advantages in having an independent defense counsel, but
experience has shown that in most jurisdictions the public defender
system has the reputation of providing representation equal to that
afforded by the most qualified private attorneys.37 As a safeguard
against the potential intrusion of political influence, a technique of
appointment may be utilized to prevent subjecting the public defender to outside coercive pressures. Suggested are civil service examinations or appointment with tenure. 3a As for the qualitative standards
of the system, no inherent structural inability appears to prevent the
system from providing the scope of representation demanded by equal
justice.39 Subject to previously mentioned objections, the system as
designed can afford representation which is competent, experienced,
and enthusiastic. This, combined with the system's ability to conduct
a complete defense because of its full investigatory facilities, allows
the defender to confront the prosecution on equal terms. 40 Further,
like the voluntary defender system, the public defender, because of
its continuity, is in a position to afford representation at an appropriately early stage of the proceedings and continue to the end of the
judicial process. Though the public defender system is not a panacea
for representation of the criminal defendant, it does presently offer
35. EQuAL JUsTiCE 45.
36. BROWNELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 146. See also Pollock, supra note 4, at 748,
where he suggests that real test of evaluation of any system is whether the system will
protect the rights of an unpopular official, as the public defender, to fully protect the
rights of a cop-beater, etc.
37. "In most of the jurisdictions examined by this committee, the public defender
system has the reputation of giving representation of a quality equal to that of the
more qualified private atorneys who practice in the criminal courts." EQUAL JUsTICE 73.
38. Id. at 92-93.
39. Id. at 72.
40. Id. at 73-74.
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considerable promise toward assuring all criminal defendants effective legal representation.
D. Mixed Public and Private System
It is proposed that a new and presently little utilized system, the
mixed public and private system, provides the best solution to the
problem. A combination of the two most lauded systems, the public
defender system and the voluntary defender system, the mixed system
draws from the strengths of the two, while avoiding the most frequently cited weaknesses. The mixed system is calculated to maintain
the high qualitative standards of representation recognized in the
two systems. This system employs an independent, privately controlled and staffed legal aid organization that receives direct appropriation of public funds to be combined with those of charitable
contributions. 41 This offsets the crippling restriction of deficient operating capital that impairs the effectiveness of the voluntary defender
system. Equally significant is the obviation of the most common and
potent objection to the public defender system, potential political
domination. Although critics of the public defender system may
attack the mixed system as well with their argument of governmental
usurpation of a private endeavor, this argument is less potent, because the mixed system is administered privately by lawyers operating independently of government direction or supervision. There
may remain, however, an objection to government subsidy. To rebut
this argument it should be emphasized that government aid to private
activities for public purpose is today a frequent combination. 42 Pri-

vate and state universities receive federal research grants and construction loans that are essential in expanding facilities and which
result in public benefit. Industry has received financial aid in order
to stimulate production and increase employment.
This system is most highly developed in England, though legal
aid in criminal cases is left outside the statutory scheme. The English
Legal Aid and Advice Acts 43 are based upon three principles that

concern the individual, the government, and the attorney. 44 As to
the individual, "The Scheme provided under the Legal Aid and
Advice Acts aims to make available to the public those services
of solicitor and counsel which a reasonable man would provide for
himself had he sufficient means to do so."45 Second, though a person
41. Id. at 52.
42. CHEATHAm, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED 50-51 (1963).

43. The basic statute is Legal Aid and Advice, 1949 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 51.
44. CHE&THA~, op. cit. supra note 42, at 45.
45. MATrnEVS, AN OuTLINm OF THE LEGAL Am AND ADVICE ScnF Es AND OF THE
PROVISIONS FOR LEGAL AiD IN CRIMINAL CASES IN ENGLAND AND WALES I (memo),
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who receives legal assistance is required, if his financial condition
warrants, to make a contribution to the legal aid fund, the major
part of the fund comes from the government. 46 At the crux of the
plan, the third principle establishes control of the scheme in the
organized legal profession, with the work being done by lawyers in
private practice. 47 As a corollary, in each case the relation between
the individual and the attorney is direct and without interposition
of a governmental official.4 The Law Society, an organization of
solicitors, is primarily responsible for administering the system. The
Society establishes panels of lawyers for the different classes of professional work.49 It is noted that in large measure the success of the
system has been due to the enthusiastic response and support of the
individual practitioner. Though a lawyer is not required to submit
his name for inclusion in the panel, practically every lawyer in the
country has done so.5°
In the United States, the mixed public-private system is little
utilized. In New York, an enabling statute5 permits any county
having a population in excess of two hundred thousand to appropriate
funds toward the maintenance of a private legal aid society. Rochester
and Buffalo have established the mixed system, and New York City,
taking advantage of the statute, has made contributions to its Legal
Aid Society.5 2 However, a recent innovation in Philadelphia indicates

greater reliance on the mixed system. The Philadelphia Defender
Association, once committed to the principle of support solely from
private sources, concluded that private financing could not be depended upon to maintain its program. To eliminate the deficiency
in its present operating budget and in order to facilitate expanded
prepared for the International Legal Aid Association Directory. In an early address to
the Law Society, the plan was outlined by Sir Thomas Lund, who was instrumental
in the preparation of the plan. Lund, The Legal Aid and Advice Scheme, 4 THE
REcorD 77 (N.Y. City B.A. 1949). The entire spectrum of legal aid was described
for the American Bar Association by the Lord Chief Justice of England. Parker, The
Development of Legal Aid in England since 1949, 48 A.B.A.J. 1029 (1962). Among
American commentaries are Smith, The English Legal Assistance Plan: Its Significance
for American Legal Institutions, 35 A.B.A.J. 453 (1949); Thompson, Developments in
the British Legal Aid Experiment, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 789 (1953).
46. CzrATsr~m, op. cit. supra note 42, at 45.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Id. at 45-46.
50. Matthews, Lawyer Referral-The English Equivalent, The Lawyer Referral
Bulletin, A.B.A. Committee on Lawyer Referral Service No. 1, at 2-3 (1963 issue).
51. N.Y. CouTcrY LA-w § 224(10). This statute provides: "The board of supervisors of any county having a population of over two hundred thousand may appropriate
such sums of money as it may deem proper toward the maintenance of a private legal
aid bureau or society organized and operating for the aid or relief of needy persons
residing within the county."

52. Ibid.
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responsibilities, the Association solicited the aid of governmental

appropriations. 53 Surely, the legal aid agencies of other communities

upon matching the vastness of their responsibilities with the limitations of their private financial supply will soon reach the same conclusion as the Philadelphia Defender Association.
III. CONCLUSION

Though it is suggested that the mixed public-private system
affords the best method of providing representation to indigent
criminal defendants, it is unrealistic to propose a model state statute

that utilizes this system alone. The variables of population, projected
numbers of criminal defendants, and the condition and attitudes
within the local bar association, the legal aid society, and the community are factors which cannot be anticipated or resolved by the

endorsement of a single system. It is more realistic and practical
to propose that a state statute permit a choice among a diversity of

methods. This is the technique employed by Congress in the Criminal
Justice Act.5M This approach allows the individual jurisdictions to

evaluate their particular situation, and to select the system which
meets their needs. Implicit in this solution is the embodiment of the

initially expressed dominant consideration: providing in fact effective
counsel. The implementation of a particular system is not the desired

goal, but only the means to the goal: providing competent counsel
to all indigent criminal defendants.
53. Supra note 4, at 751 n.32.
54. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006 (Supp. 1964). The Criminal Justice Act provides alternatives among which a choice is to be made by the federal district court. The alternatives are representation by assigned attorneys, representation by attorneys furnished
by the bar association or legal aid society, or representation containing a combination
of the two. Though the federal policy seems clear, the act is the culmination of a
quarter-century of conflicting opinion, with the ultimate omission of a fourth and fifth
choice that would have included a federal defender or reliance on the state defender
system. Since 1937 the American Bar Association, the Department of Justice, and the
Judicial Conference of the United States have endorsed legislation to provide counsel
for the indigent in the federal courts. On numerous occasions bills were introduced
into the House of Representatives which were the subject of hearings before the House
Judiciary Committee, but none of which was ever reported out of the Committee.
In April, 1961, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy appointed a special committee
of judges, lawyers, and legal scholars, under the chairmanship of Professor Francis A.
Allen of the University of Michigan Law School, to investigate and evaluate the federal
needs in this regard. Out of the collective judgment of this group, there emerged
a plan that was endorsed by the Attorney General and proposed to the Congress by
President John F. Kennedy. Both the legislation proposed by the committee, H.R. 4816
and S. 1057 as it passed the Senate included the alternative options of a federal defender
office and utilization of the local public defender. The Conference Committee adopted
the Senate version of the bill; but amended it by deleting the use of these methods;
and suggested that the Department of Justice revive its recent study in order to reexamine the need for such system. See also H.R. REP. No. 864, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963); S. REP,. No. 346, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); CoNF. REP. No. 1709, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1964).
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Prenatal Injuries and Wrongful Death
A recent development in the law of torts is the increasing recognition that injuries negligently inflicted upon an unborn child afford
a basis for an action for damages. This development has created a
need for legislative amendment of the wrongful death acts1 defining
the rights of the personal representative of an unborn child when
prenatal injuries result in the death of a fetus, either by abortion 2
or stillbirth.
TElE PROBLEM

Before 1946, 3 nearly all the decisions denied recovery to a child
who was born deformed as a result of injuries sustained en ventre sa
mere.4 However, this rule has been rapidly overturned and a child
is now generally permitted to recover for prenatal injuries;5 the older6
rule denying a right of recovery remains in only three jurisdictions.
Paralleling this recognition of the child's right to recover for prenatal
injuries, the decisions now generally allow a cause of action by the
child's personal representative under the wrongful death acts when
the prenatal injuries cause death following birth.7 However, when the
1. The origin and effect of the wrongful death acts has been summarized as follows:
"By . . . common-law rule, neither the members of the family of the injured person
nor his personal representative had any cause of action for the loss occasioned by his
death. This . . . has been changed, in all the states, by statutes, which are modeled
upon Lord Campbell's Act adopted in England in 1846, and are known as Death Acts."
McCoEmcE, DAmAGES § 93 (1935). See TxrANY, Dr.TH By WRoNGrUL AcT § 24
(2d ed. 1913), for the differences in wording of the various state statutes. The
variations in the statutes are minor and of little significance to the topic discussed
in this note.
2. "Medically, the term 'abortion' applies to any termination of pregnancy prior to
viability of the fetus, regardless of cause." 1 GnAY, ATborNsEY's HANBoox oF MEDICWn
§ 58.01(1) (3d ed. Supp. 1964).
3. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), was the first decision to permit
a child a recovery for prenatal injuries.
4. PnossEn, ToRTS § 56 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATm, NT, TORTS § 869 (1939). The
first reported English or American case on the subject was Dietrich v. Northampton,
138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884), in which Judge (later Justice) Holmes wrote
the opinion denying a child's right to seek recovery. Judge Holmes' reasons have
"generally provided the basis in precedent and logic for all subsequent cases which
reached a similar conclusion." Del Tufo, Recovery for Pre-Natal Torts: Actions for
Wrongful Death, 15 RuTGERs L. REv. 61, 64 (1960).
5. Pnossmn, TORTS § 56 (3d ed. 1964). The counter-arguments to the decision
reached in Dietrich v. Northampton, supra note 4, which are generally given in support
of the modem trend are treated comprehensively in Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353,
157 A.2d 497 (1960).

6. Dean Prosser characterizes the continued existence of the older rule in Alabama,

Rhode Island and Texas as resting merely upon "decisions not yet overruled." PNossE,
TorTs § 56 (3d ed. 1964).
7. See Amman v. Faidy, 415 IMI.422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Keyes v. Construction
Service, Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St.
529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950).
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same type of injuries result in the death of the fetus before birth,
there is sharp conflict concerning the right of the personal representative to maintain an action under the wrongful death acts.3 The

decisions which have considered the question do not indicate a

trend,9 and, apparently, the result that a particular jurisdiction will
reach can not be predicted. The courts which have most forcefully
advocated the legal correctness and social justice of allowing the
child a right of action to recover when negligently inflicted prenatal
injuries cause deformity are frequently the most adamant in denying
the personal representative a recovery for wrongful death when the
injuries are sufficiently severe to cause the death of the fetus.10
In addition to the uncertain status of the case law, a further con-

sideration suggests that legislative action is needed to clarify this area.
The right of action for wrongful death was granted by legislative
fiat, and at a time when prenatal injuries afforded no basis for a
cause of action." Therefore, it is suggested, there could have been

no legislative intention that the rights created by the death acts
should accrue upon the wrongful death of a fetus, and that extension
or modification of the statutory right to include the wrongful death
of a fetus should originate with the legislature.' 2 A legislature con8. PNossER, TORTS § 56 (3d ed. 1964).
9. The fifteen jurisdictions which have directly considered the question are approximately equally divided: Allowing a recovery: (7) Gorke v. LeClerc, 23 Conn. Sup.
256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955);
Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d
901 (Ky. 1955); Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So.2d 847 (La. App.
1951); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Stidam v. Ashmore,
109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959). Recovery denied: (8) Norman v.
Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Keyes v. Construction Service,
Inc., supra note 7; Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951);
Graf v. Taggert, 140 A.2d 204 (N.J. 1964); In re Logan's Estate, 4 Misc. 2d 283,
156 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1956); Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (OHd. 1953); West v. McCoy,
233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d
221 (1958).
10. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, for example, recognized the child's right
to recover for injuries causing deformity, thus overruling Dietrich v. Northampton,
supra note 4, saying: "Natural justice demands recognition of a legal right of a child
to begin life unimpaired by physical or mental defects resulting from the injury caused
by the negligence of another." Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc., supra note 7, at
635, 165 N.E.2d at 914. However, the court remanded with orders that the plaintiff
be permitted to amend to show whether the child had lived a short time before death
or had been born dead, for "liability attaches on fulfillment of an implied condition
that the child be born alive." Id. at 636, 165 N.E.2d at 915. Compare Smith v.
Brennan, supra note 5 (broadly approving the child's right to recover), with Graf v.
Taggert, supra note 11 (an opinion by the same judge reaching the opposite conclusion
in a prenatal death case.)
11. The first case in which recovery for prenatal injuries was allowed was decided
in 1946. See note 3, supra. Prior to 1946, each of the states had enacted %vrongful
death legislation. McCoamncic, DAMAGES § 106 (1935).
12. The following language of the Tennessee Supreme Court is characteristic of this
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sidering a statutory amendment would probably find three facets to

the problem requiring resolution:
1. Whether a right of action under the wrongful death act should accrue
upon the wrongful death of a fetus.
2. Whether, if such a right be granted, it should arise only when the
injury causing the wrongful death was inflicted after the child had attained

viability.' 3

3. What should be the measure of the damages recoverable in such an
action.

THE RIGHT OF RECOVERY
The proponents of a right of action under the death acts for the
death of a fetus from negligently inflicted prenatal injuries have
reasoned: (1) that such a result is a logical corollary to allowing
the child a right of recovery for prenatal injuries when it survives;
and (2) that allowing a right of recovery is consistent with the
philosophy and purpose of the wrongful death statutes. To permit the
child a right of action for prenatal injuries, it is suggested, is to
regard the child in esse at the time of the injury, and therefore, a
juridical "person" to whom a duty of care is owed within the meaning
and protection of the wrongful death acts. 14 The purpose of the
death acts is expressed in the preamble to Lord Campbell's Act,15
the English statute after which the American death acts are patterned,
as follows:
Whereas, no action at law is now maintainable against a person who, by
his wrongful act, neglect or default, may have caused the death of another
viewpoint: "Where a right of action is dependent upon the provisions of a statute,
as in the case at bar, we are not privileged to create such a right under the guise of a
liberal interpretation of it. Judicial legislation has long been regarded by the legal
profession as unwise, if not dangerous business. It is generally an ill-starred adventure
by wilful men." Hogan v. McDaniel, supra note 9, at 239, 319 S.W.2d at 223. See
also Hale v. Manion, supra note 9, at 147, 368 P.2d at 3 (dissent); Stidam v.
Ashmore, supra note 9, at 435, 167 N.E.2d at 109 (dissent).
13. "Viability implies that the fetus is capable of maintaining life outside the
uterus. . . . Inasmuch as there are no reported survivals of a fetus born prior to
the 22nd week of pregnancy and weighing under 500 gins. (2 lbs.), the criteria
of both ... [Length] of pregnancy and birth weight have been suggested as definitive
of expectancy of survival." 1 GRAY, ATroRNEY's HANDBOOK OF MEDinxc
§ 58.01(1)
(3d ed. Supp. 1964).
14. In Stidam v. Ashmore, supra note 9, the court reviewed prior decisions in which
the child had been allowed a recovery for non-fatal prenatal injuries and concluded:
"[O]nce we have accepted the basic proposition that the decedent was a person at
the time of the injury, the substantive rights necessarily resulting from that fact
may surely be enforced, whatever may be the practical difficulties involved." Id. at
435, 167 N.E.2d at 108. See also, Gorke v. LeClerc, supra note 9; Amman v. Faidy,
supra note 9; Poliquin v. MacDonald, supra note 9.
15. 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
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. that the wrongdoer in such case

should be answerable in damages for the injury so caused by him.16

That recovery for prenatal injuries should be denied and the wrong-

doer exculpated solely because the injuries negligently inflicted were
death of the unborn child is
sufficiently severe to produce the
17

described as an "absurd" result.

The opponents of a right of recovery have generally posed three
contentions in support of their conclusion: (1) The mother's right
of recovery for general damages for the miscarriage makes the need
for a right of action for the death of the unborn child more apparent

than real

8

and presents the danger of double recovery; 19 (2) the

difficulties of proof of causation would permit fraudulent claims and

decisions based only on the grossest speculations; 20 (3) the policy
considerations which militate in favor of a right of action to compensate a living child for prenatal injuries which may have rendered
permanent impairment to his life do not support a cause of action

in behalf
of the parents when the injury results in death to the
21

fetus.
It is submitted that these arguments are not reasons for
denying the right of recovery, but, rather, point only to a need for
the most careful judicial administration of the cause of action if
granted. The mother who has sustained an injury which results in
miscarriage has been allowed recovery for mental and physical pain

16. Ti FArY, DEa BY WRON FL ACT § 20 (2d ed. 1913).
17. Stidam v. Ashmore, supra note 9, at 435, 167 N.E.2d at 108.
18. "Considering the highly speculative nature of the pecuniary value of an unborn
child, even if viable, it is apparent that practically everything that could be recovered
in an action of an unborn child can now be recovered by the mother in connection
with her own claim for general damages." Norman v. Murphy, supra note 9, at 98,
268 P.2d at 180. See also In re Logan, supra note 9, at 285, 156 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
19. PnossEa, ToRTs § 56 (3d ed. 1964).
20. "Claim is frequently made that the sole cause of abortion, miscarriage, or
premature labor has been an injury. Unless this was obviously of very major degree,
it is but rarely competent ....
Honest women who do abort without known cause
very logically blame a recently remembered incident of unusual character and may
feel that they should be recompensed." 1 GRAY, ATroNE y's HANDBOOK OF MnciCNE
§ 58.11 (3d ed. 1964). The inability of the jury to properly evaluate such claims is
frequently emphasized: "Can it be maintained that immediately after conception,
whether the infant later is born alive or not, the infant in utero is a legal person? At
least in our system of law, where the jury plays such a large role in the determination
of fact, we must return a negative answer to such a broad question, largely because
the difficulty of proving the causal connection between the wrongful act and the
injury is too great, and too remote." Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in
the Law of Torts, 10 CALwF. L. Rzv. 461, 469 (1921). See also In re Logan's Estate,
supra note 9, at 285, 156 N.Y.S.2d at 51; Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan,
124 Tex. 347, 359, 78 S.W.2d 944, 949 (1935) ("a rule of right may well be founded
upon the inherent and inevitable difficulty of impossibility of proof.")
21. In re Logan's Estate, supra note 9; West v. McCoy, supra note 9; 2 HARPE AND
JAMEs, TORTs § 18.3 (1956).
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resulting from the miscarriage per sena the fear of miscarriagens and
mental suffering caused by the fear and apprehension that she will
give birth to a deformed child.24 Also, the father has a cause of
action for loss of consortium 5 However, neither the mother nor the
father is allowed a recovery for the loss of the child. 26 The danger that
a jury will erroneously award damages for the wrongful death of the
child in the mother's or father's action emphasizes the need for carefully instructing the jury concerning the elements of damages recoverable in each of the actions. Also, the possibility of overlapping
recoveries is made less likely by the fact that the various causes of
action arising from the wrongful death of an unborn child will
generally be consolidated for trial 7 The problems of proof, though
difficult, are not unlike problems of medical proof frequently encountered in the law of torts.2 In Valence v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co.,29 the Court of Appeals of Louisiana recognized a right of
recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus, but reversed a verdict for
the plaintiff after carefully evaluating the medical proofs on the
issue of causation.30 This decision indicates the need for and the
ability of the courts to administer the right of action so as to eliminate
claims founded upon fraudulent or insufficient proof of causation.
That public policy should favor the child who lives to face life in a
deformed condition more than the parents of a fetus which has been
killed is at least debatable. In any wrongful death case it might be
contended that the injured party is better off dead than alive to
endure suffering and disability. However, this contention wholly
fails to consider that in either case the defendant's conduct is equally
22. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 65 (1941).

See, e.g., Morris v. St. Paul R.R., 105 Minn.

276, 117 N.W. 500 (1906); Wallace v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 88 Or. 219,
170 Pac. 283 (1918).
23. 25 CJ.S. Damages § 70 (1941).
24. See Davis v. Murray, 9 Ga. App. 120, 113 S.E. 827 (1922).
25. "The husband's action is for the consequences affecting his estate, and for
depriving him of the aid, society, and companionship of his wife, which, except for
the wrong, he might reasonably expect to enjoy." Butler v. Manhattan Ry., 143 N.Y.
417, 420, 38 N.E. 454, 455 (1894).
26. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 65 (1941). "The loss of the child may be shown as
affecting the extent of her [the mother's] personal injury and a recovery by her, or on
her behalf for her pain and suffering therefrom or for the impairment of her health."
Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555, 570 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
27. 1 C.J.S. Actions § 111 (1936).
28. "Such difficulty of proof is not special to this particular dnd of action; and it is
beside the point, anyhow, in determining whether such action is maintainable." Mitchell
v. Couch, supra note 9, at 906. A comprehensive listing and discussion of the factors
an attorney should consider during the investigation of a claim for abortion, miscarriage
or premature labor is to be found at 1 GRAY, ATToRNEY's HANDBooK OF MEnscm
§ 58.11 (3d ed. 1964).
29. Supra note 9.
30. Id. at 850-54.
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tortious, and that the unborn child has an interest in being born alive,
as well as in living a full and complete life after birth.31 Also, the
death act proposes to compensate the next of kin for the pecuniary
value of the life lost.32 The recognition of a right of recovery for

the wrongful death of an unborn child furthers the purpose of the
wrongful death statutes. The arguments opposed to the right of
recovery serve to emphasize the need for careful judicial administration3 to prevent abuses of the right granted.
THE VIABIrry-4 IssuE

The decisions permitting recovery for the wrongful death of an
unborn child have all involved viable fetuses. Although the right of
the personal representative to maintain an action for the wrongful
death of a non-viable fetus has been directly presented in only one
case,-5 the decisions allowing a right of recovery have frequently
stated the issue and holding to include only "a viable, unborn child."' 6
In a number of cases in which a child sought recovery for prenatal
injuries sustained prior to viability, the viability issue has generally
been resolved favorably to the child.37 The authorities favoring the
position that viability should be a condition precedent to any right
of action contend that, as a non-viable fetus is unable to exist apart
31. Del Tufo, Recovery for PrenatalTorts; Actions for Wrongful Death, 15 RtrrcFS
L. REV. 61, 77 (1960).
32. McCowv1ncK, DA AGES § 93 (1935).
33. In Smith v. Brennan, supra note 5, the court observed: "The trial courts retain
sufficient control, through the rules of evidence and the requirements as to the
sufficiency of evidence, to safeguard against the danger that juries will find facts
without legally adequate proof." Id. at 366, 157 A.2d at 503-04.
34. Supra note 13.
35. In Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962), recovery was denied the
administratrix of a non-viable unborn child. Whether a right of recovery would have

been allowed had the child been viable is not clear. The court recognized a liberal
trend in several decisions which had disregarded the viability requirement in cases

brought by a child to recover for prenatal injuries, and concluded without giving any
reasons that the situations in those cases were "clearly distinguishable from an action
for wrongful death." Id. at 708.
36. See Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954); Stidam v. Aslunore,
supra note 9; Durrett v. Owens, 371 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn. 1963). Were the unborn child
not viable at the time the injuries were negligently inflicted, it is possible some courts
which have allowed recovery would have reached the opposite conclusion on the
ground that the child was not a "person" at the time of the injury within the
meaning of the death acts. See note 38 infra.
37. "Most of the cases allowing recovery [by a child for prenatal injuries] have
involved a fetus which was then viable. . . .Many of . .. [the courts] have said, by
way of dictum, that recovery must be limited to such cases .... ."Pnossm%, ToTs §
56 (3d ed. 1964). However, the modem trend and the majority rule where a child
who sustained pre-viability injuries is actually before the court is to allow recovery.
ibid. See, e.g., Smith v. Brennan, supra note 5; Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164
A.2d 93 (1960), for decisions characteristic of this modem trend.
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from the mother, it is not a separate legal "person" to whom a duty
of care is owed, 8 and that to extend the right of recovery to include
prenatal injuries incurred prior to the time of viability creates difficult
problems of proof of causation 39 which encourage decisions based
chiefly upon speculation. 40 A majority of the courts and legal writers
who have directly considered the issue of viability have rejected the
requirement in the light of modem medical learning and, moreover,
as an arbitrary limitation on recovery which itself presents difficult
problems of proof. The unborn child is now generally regarded by
medical authority as biologically separate from the mother from the
moment of conception,41 and, it is argued, legal separability should
43
begin with biological separability.4 The requisite proof of causation
is the same as that now required of the mother in her action for
miscarriage. Moreover, the requirement that the fetus be viable at
the time of injury may itself defeat honest claims in close cases
wherein the plaintiff has proven a causal connection between the
negligence of the defendant and the prenatal death, but is unable to
establish the exact moment of viability. 44 Therefore, the requirement
38. See Albertsworth, supra note 20, at 470. This reasoning has been followed in
many of the decisions which have allowed a recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus.
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Couch, supra note 9; Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38
N.W.2d 838 (1949); Poliquin v. MacDonald, supra note 9; Stidam v. Ashmore, supra
note 9. The following statement is typical: "We are also of the opinion that a fetus
having reached that period of prenatal maturity where it is capable of independent
life apart from its mother is a person and if such child dies in the womb as a result
of another's negligence, an action for recovery may be maintained in its behalf."
Poliquin v. MacDonald, supra note 9, at 107, 135 A.2d at 251.
39. Diagnosis of the cause of an abortion becomes more difficult as we go back to
the beginning of pregnancy. "[Tlhe further the pregnancy has advanced, the easier it
is to diagnose an abortion. In the first few weeks of pregnancy the ovum has not
yet dilated the uterus and changed the sexual organs to the extent to which the
growth of the ovum changes the genital organs bye and bye." HEBzoG, MEDICAL JumIsPRuDEN E § 948 (1931). See also, 1 GnAy, AroaNE's HANTnoox OF MEDICINE
58.11(3) (3d ed. Supp. 1964).
40. Reed, Pre-Natal Injuries; Development of the Right of Recovery, 10 DEENsE
L.J. 29, 46-48 (1961).
41. "Medical authorities have long recognized that a child is in existence from the
moment of conception, and not merely a part of its mother's body." Smith v. Brennan,
supra note 5, at 362, 157 A.2d at 502, quoting 1 BECK, MEDICAL JURisPRuDENCE 277
(11th ed. 1860). That the child cannot live apart from his mother has been held
not to affect his separability: "That it may not live if its protection and nourishment
are cut off earlier than the viable stage of its development is not to destroy its
separability; it is rather to describe conditions under which life will not continue.
Succeeding conditions exist, of course, that have that result at every stage of its life,
post-natal as well as pre-natal." Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 544, 125
N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (1953).
42. lbd.
43. "[Wlith the advance of modem science and with the safeguards of requiring
adequate proof of the injury, there appears to be no sound reason to deny . . . an
opportunity to prove his case." Muse & Spinella, Right of Infant to Recover for
Pre-Natal Injury, 36 VA. L. REv. 611, 623 (1950).
44. "In the first place, age is not the sole measure of viability, and there is nb real
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of a viable fetus can produce problems of proof equally as great

as those which it purportedly obviates. It is submitted that there
is neither a legal, nor medical basis, nor any practical justification for
the requirement that the fetus shall have45 attained viability at the
time the injury causing death was inflicted.
TBE MEASURE OF DAMAGES

RECOVERABLE

46

The measure of the damages recoverable by the personal representative in an action for the wrongful death of his decedent is the
pecuniary value of the life of the decedent to the parties for whose
benefit the action is brought.47 When the action is for the wrongful
death of a child, the jury normally considers evidence concerning
the deceased's age, sex, personal characteristics, and the general

health of the deceased and the financial station of the family.4"

way of determining in a borderline case whether or not a fetus was viable at the
time of the injury, unless it was immediately born." Smith v. Brennan, supra note 5, at
367, 157 A.2d at 504. In Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, supra note 20,
the difficulty of proving viability was given as one reason for denying recovery
altogether.
45. See notes 40 & 41 supra.
46. The measure of damages which is universally applied in wrongful death cases
is generally regarded as grossly inaccurate and speculative, and this is considered to
be especially true when the decedent is a minor child. See notes 48, 49 & 51 infra.
The uncertainty of the measure of damages has caused about one-third of the states
to impose a maximum limit on the amount of damages recoverable in an action for
wrongful death. McCoiwmcx, DAMAGES § 104 (1935). Perhaps the dangers of
excessive judgments due to speculation would be ameliorated were such a maximum
limitation on damages universally applied in wrongful death cases, and the ceiling on
damages recoverable set even lower when the action is for the wrongful death of a
minor child. (In some states such limitations are prohibited by constitutional provision,
see note 50 infra.) Dean Prosser has suggested that the entire philosophy of the
damages recoverable for wrongful death should be reconsidered. Pnossmu, TonRTs §
121 (3d ed. 1964). The general subject of the measure of damages recoverable for
wrongful death is beyond the scope of this note. The following discussion is intended
to demonstrate merely that the problems attendant to the measure of damages recoverable for wrongful death afford no apparent basis for either denying or limiting the
damages recoverable for the wrongful death of a fetus as compared with the recovery
allowed for the wrongful death of a minor child.
47. Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, did not limit the damages
recoverable to pecuniary loss. However, the English courts soon created such a
limitation: "There may be a calculation of the pecuniary loss sustained by the different
members of the family from the death of one of them: but, if the jury were to
proceed to estimate the respective degrees of mental anguish of a widow and twelve
children from the death of the father of the family, a serious danger might arise of
damages being given to the ruin of defendants." Blake v. Midland Ry., 118 Eng. Rep.
35, 42, 18 Q.B. 93, 111 (1852). The American statutes have either expressly so
limited the damages recoverable or such has been held to be implicit in the fact
that the American statutes were patterned after Lord Campbell's Act upon which
this limitation was superimposed by judicial decision. McComnci, DAMAGES § 93
(1935).
48. McComicx, DcmAGEs § 101 (1935). See Lane v. Hatfield, 173 Ore. 79,
143 P.2d 230 (1943), in which the Supreme Court of Oregon upheld a judgment of
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However, in cases where the child's death was prenatal, some
authorities have considered the evidence from which to infer pecuniary
loss so uniformly speculative as to command either denying the right
of recovery altogether,49 or limiting the amount of damages recoverable 0 It is submitted that the measure of damages now applied
universally in wrongful death cases is inherently a determination
involving considerable conjecture, and that this standard applied in
prenatal death cases will produce results no more speculative than
those in cases involving minor children. The measure of damages
has been described as "vague, uncertain, and speculative if not
conjectural" 51 even when applied to determine the pecuniary value of
an adult life. Moreover, where the deceased was a young child, it
has been suggested that damages honestly calculated under the
pecuniary-value standard could never be anything but a minus quality,
since "any realistic view of the prospects must mean that the cost
of rearing the child 52 will far exceed any conceivable pecuniary benefit
that might ever be optimistically expected of him.""- The judgments
awarded for the wrongful deaths of children are generally regarded
as explainable only on the basis that juries are awarding damages
on the basis of sentimentality rather than on the basis of pecuniary
loss.M Therefore, inexactitude and even speculation in the measure
of the damages recoverable is a common characteristic of wrongful
death cases, especially where the deceased was a young child. The
only evidence available concerning the characteristics of the deceased
in a case brought for the death of a young child which may be
unavailable when death is prenatal, is the sex of the child and depending on the age of the child, indications of personal capabilities.
$5,000 for the wrongful death of a seven-year-old girl, saying: "To the extent that a
seven year old girl's life could do so, decedents life, as shown by the testimony,
supports the conclusion that decedent was active, alert and gave promise of a successful and commendable fruition." Id. at 90, 143 P.2d at 234.
49. See, e.g., Graft v. Taggert, supra note 9; 2 HARPER & JAmFS, TORTS § 18.3
(1956).
50. See Anderson, A Model State Wrongful Death Act, 1 Hazv. J. LEG. 28 (1964),
in which a limit of $1,000 beyond actual medical expenses is recommended as a
maximum amount of recovery because "of the highly speculative nature of the injury."
Id. at 42-43. However, some states prohibit by constitutional provision the statutory
limitation of damages. Id. at 44.
51. Lane v. Hatfield, supra note 43, at 89, 143 P.2d at 234.
52. "In 1946 Dublin and Lotka, The Money Value of a Man, 55, Table 14, estimated the cost of raising a child to the age of eighteen would be $16,337 for a
family with an income of $5,000 to $10,000. On the basis of the change in price
levels as reflected in Pres. Econ. Rep. 1959, 184 Table d-38, the 1959 equivalent of
this would be $34,483." Pnossxn, TORTS § 121 (3d ed. 1964).
53. Ibid. This is peculiarly true in those jurisdictions which allow recovery only for
the pecuniary benefit the parents would receive during the child's minority. See, e.g.,
Hudnut v. Schmidt, 324 IIl. App. 548, 58 N.E.2d 929 (1944).
54. PsossER, ToRTS § 121 (3d ed. 1964); McCoRmPcK, DAMAGES § 101 (1935).
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However, can it be said beyond conjecture that a boy will make a
more substantial pecuniary contribution to a family than a girl, or
vice versa? Also, while the child's abilities may determine his capacity
to contribute to his parents, it can hardly be said beyond conjecture
that his abilities determine the actual pecuniary contributions he will
make. 55 Assuming that the pecuniary value of the life of the decedent
is strictly adhered to in measuring the damages recoverable, it is
suggested that the needs presented by the geographical and financial
station of the family is the most important factor indicating the
contributions a child would have been called upon to make, and
evidence of this is present whether the death is the prenatal death of
a fetus, or that of a minor child.
PROPOSED STATUTORY AMENDMENT

Thus, it is suggested that the legislatures of the several states amend
their wrongful death statutes to include the following concept.56
The mother, or father if the mother does not survive, may maintain an
action to recover damages against any person vho by a wrongful act,
neglect or default causes the death of an unborn child, and such action may
be maintained whether the child was viable or non-viable at the time of the
said wrongful act, neglect, or default.

Truth in Lending
TBm PROBLEM
In the Spring of 1961, President John F. Kennedy, in his consumer
protection message to the Congress' strongly urged the passage of
55. Considering the tendency for capable children to continue their education
through college and even further, the more capable the child the more substantial
may be the financial burden on the parents.
156. Although the various death acts are similar in their origin and effect, there are
variations in the language employed. See, note 1 supra. Therefore, the wording of a
statutory amendment to effect the proposed change would be varied to conform with
the language of the particular wrongful death act.
1. This was the historic speech of March 15, 1962, in which President Kennedy
set out the bill of rights of the consumer and strongly urged passage of consumerprotective legislation, particularly the previously proposed Truth in Lending Bill of
Senator Paul Douglas. Hearings on S. 750 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 4 (1963)
[hereinafer cited as 1963 Hearings]. This position was reaffirmed by President Lyndon
B. Johnson in a similar message to Congress February 5, 1964. H.R. Doc. No. 220,
58th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).

1965 ]

LEGISLATION

legislation which would deal with major problems of consumer
economics. In this address he apprised the lawmakers that:
Excessive and untimely use of credit arising out of ignorance of its true
cost is harmful both to the stability of the economy and to the welfare of
the public. Legislation should therefore be enacted requiring lenders and
vendors to disclose to borrowers in advance the actual amounts and rates
which they will be paying for credit. Such legislation, similar in this sense
to the truth-in-securities laws of 1933-34, would not control prices or
charges. But it would require full disclosure to installment buyers and other
prospective credit users, and thus permit 2 consumers to make informed
decisions before signing on the dotted line.

The apparent need for federal legislation stems from the magnitude
of outstanding consumer credit-today exceeding 230 billion dollars.

The consuming public not only pays in excess of 15 billion dollars
per annum in interest payments, but also has mortgaged more than
60 per cent of current income. 3 Additionally, the current bankruptcy
rate is more than twice that of the depression years and, significantly,
almost 90 per cent are individual bankruptcies, most of which were
caused by overuse of personal credit.4 Much of the overuse is due to
uninformed buying and the ineptitude of the consumer at calculating
how much the "easy payment" plans are actually costing him in terms
of interest. Interest is an area of almost total bewilderment to the
average consumer 5 because of the varied methods of interest calculation employed by the retail and finance industries. 6 The problem can
be aptly illustrated by a comparison of two of the most commonly
used methods, the add-on and the discount procedures: Suppose X
wants to borrow 100 dollars and in shopping around for credit he
finds that both the bank and the finance company are advertising
cash loans at 6 per cent interest per annum. Seemingly, it is im2. Ibid.
3. Supra note 1, at 5.
4. Ibid.
5. The confusion accompanying interest calculations is aptly illustrated in testimony
by William McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, former
Under-Secretary of the Treasury and former President of the New York Stock
Exchange. This widely experienced financier admitted that even a man of his background is confused by the current interest rate practices. Hearings on S. 1740 Before
a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 1st
& 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 275 (1961 [hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearings].
6. In addition to the add-on and discount methods, other common practices include
no quotation of interest charges, quotation of a monthly rate, the plus-fee system,
etc. The result is that misleading practices arise such as (a) department stores statement of 1%% monthly which is actually 18% per annum, (b) small loan companies 3%
per month which totals 36% per annum, (c) bank 4%% installment auto loans which
are really 9% per annum, (d) 5% installment home improvements loans (advertised as
less than the 6% first mortgage) which are actually 10% per annum, (e) the newest fad
of weekly interest for teenage purchases which runs as high as 80% per annum.
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material which credit institution X chooses since they both advertise
the same rate but, suppose the loan company computes interest by
the add-on method while the bank employs the discount method:
Add-on method: Under this system X would be charged $6.00 interest
which would be added to the principal thus requiring repayment of $106.00
at $8.83 per month. X would receive $100.00.
Discount method: This method would discount the $6.00 interest charge
from the principal and X would pay back $100.00 at $8.33 per month. X

would receive $94.00.

Thus under both methods X has paid $6.00 interest but under the
discount method he received the use of only $94.00 while under the
add-on procedure he has $100.00. Therefore, he has paid a lower rate
of interest for the money under the add-on method because he gets
the use of more money for the same amount of interest. However,
there is a further complicating factor in that neither of these methods

illustrates a true annual interest of 6 per cent. Actually, under the
add-on method, the true annual interest would be close to 12 per cent
and the discount rate would be even higher, since repayment has to
begin immediately and X does not have the use of the principle for
the entire year. By the end of the sixth month, he has repaid over
half of the principal to the lender, whereas under 6 per cent true
annual interest, X would have the use of the principal for the entire
year. Thus when the public, faced with the myriad variations of

statement of interest under the add-on and discount methods, additionally has to cope with the declining balance method 7 it is apparent

that the consumer seeking to shop wisely for credit is lost in a maze
of mathematical computations.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

To cope with this problem, Senator Paul Douglas introduced the
Truth in Lending Bill,8 the express purpose of which is to require
the disclosure of the two indispensable elements of a credit trans7. The declining balance method is typified by the revolving charge account in
which interest is added to the balance each month so as the balance declines the
amount of interest declines correspondingly.
8. This bill was originally introduced in the Senate January 7, 1960, as S. 2755 and
was referred to the Subcommittee on Production & Stability which held hearings and
reported to the full Committee on Banking & Currency. August 27, 1961, it was
reintroduced as S. 1740, further hearings were held, and 1,804 pages of hearing
material were published. The bill was not reported to the full Committee. February
7, 1963, the bill was reintroduced as S. 750 and another 2,376 pages of hearing material
were compiled. Subcommittee hearings were held in four locations outside Washington
and the bill was sent to full committee only to be returned to subcommittee for
further consideration.

19651]

LEGISLATION

action: the total dollar amount and the interest rate stated in terms
of true annual interest. The object of the legislation is to provide
the consumer a simple basis of comparison, regardless of the method
of computation employed. Specifically, the bill would require any
creditor to furnish in advance a written statement setting forth:
(1) the cash price of goods or services to be purchased; (2) the
amount, if any, to be credited as down payment and for trade-in;
(3) the difference between (1) and (2) or the amount of the purchase
price to be financed; (4) the charges, individually itemized, which
are paid or are to be paid by the consumer of credit in connecti6n with
the transaction; (5) total amount to be financed; (6) the finance
charge (which includes "interest, fees, service charges, discounts, and
such other charges incident to the extension of credit") expressed
in terms of dollars and cents; (7) percentage that the finance charge
bears to the total amount to be financed expressed as a simple annual
rate on the outstanding unpaid balance of the obligation. 9 The aim
of the bill is much like that of the Securities Exchange Act 10 in that
it does not seek to control prices of credit but only to require full
disclosure. The penalty provision calls for civil" as well as criminal
sanctions, but the original provision compelling strict accurateness
of the statement of interest was removed by amendment. Under
the present bill there is neither penalty nor civil recovery for erroneous
computation, but a willful violation can bring a maximum 5,000 dollar
fine and one year imprisonment. Constitutionality of the legislation
rests on the commerce clause,' including the necessity of the promotion of economic stabilization as a legitimate national purpose. 3
OBJECTIONS

Strong objections have been raised to the federal legislation premised primarily on these arguments: (1) The bill imposes an
impossible burden on the businessman because of the complexities
of computing simple annual interest on each transaction; (2) instead
of bringing about full disclosure the bill would actually precipitate
misrepresentation and deceit; and (3) this is an area of legislation
9. Supra note 1, at 17.
10. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1958).

11. The creditor would be liable for non-disclosure to the borrower or buyer in the

amount of $100, or an amount equal to twice the finance charge, whichever is greater,
not to exceed $2,000.

12. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl.3.
13. Of some significance on the question of constitutionality is the fact that two
present United States Supreme Court Justices, Byron R. White and Arthur J. Goldberg
supported the bill when they were in the executive branch of government. Deputy
Attorney General White stated that if a substantial bearing on interstate commerce
could be shown the bill would, in his opinion, be upheld. 1961 Hearings 13.
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which should be left to the states.' 4 It is particularly with reference
to the widely used revolving charge account that the opponents of
the bill reason that the small businessman would be burdened by
the complexities of the computations and the large businesses would
be hampered due to their great volume of credit transactions. However subcommittee hearings revealed that slide computers are available
to the small businessman which will enable him, with relative ease,
to make accurate computation of true annual interest.' 5 Regarding
the complaint of the large businesses, a witness' 6 who, as Vice President of Sears Roebuck & Co., originated the Sears Revolving Charge
Account system which served as the model for the entire industry,
not only testified that the bill was entirely workable under the
revolving charge system but also urged its adoption on the grounds
that:
(1) It will arm consumers with the basic price information necessary for
rational decisions among alternatives; (2) it will invigorate competition in
the consumer credit market and reward the more efficient credit supplier;
(3) by rendering consumer charges more cyclically sensitive it will contribute to the overall stability of our economy, and (4) lastly, it will, like
the Securities Exchange Act, eliminate the possibility of deception and near
17
fraud from a major sector of our economy.

Finally, with regard to the first objection, it is readily admitted by

both proponents and opponents of the bill that interest calculation
is complex either under the present system with the complexities on
the general public or under the new proposed system with the
complexities shifted to the business world. However, it is submitted
that where Congress has found a need for legislation, the burden
should be placed where it can best be carried and it is obviously
easier to educate the already widely experienced retail and finance
14. The issue of whether this area of legislation should be dealt with exclusively
by the states is a topic which would require full separate treatment. Thus it is
beyond the scope of this article which is limited to consideration of the federal bill
on its own merits.
A major obstacle in getting any substantial action other than in subcommittee is
the fact that Senator A. Willis Robertson, Chairman of the Committee on Banking
and Currency, opposes the bill on the grounds that this is a matter to be left to the
states. In a "question" to the Subcommittee he stated: "In my judgment the states
can handle this field ... and the lists of legislation enacted in 1955 through 1960 ...
and during the calendar year 1961 indicate that the states are, in fact, being very
active in this field." 1961 Hearings 993. For charts showing the action that has been
taken by states in this area see 38 NoTRE D.mm LAw. 614 (1963), and 1961 Hearings
1377 a, b, c & d.
15, 1963 Hearings 8, 9, and examination of witnesses throughout the testimony.
16. Mr. Edward Gudeman, who is presently Under-Secretary in the Department of
Commerce also stated the support of the department for the legislation.
17. 1963 Hearingspt. 2, at 23.
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industries in the intricacies of interest calculation than it would be to
educate the general public.
The merits of the bill are next attacked on the ground that its
effect, if enacted, would be that interest charges would simply be
hidden in the price of merchandise, thus defrauding rather than
informing the public.' 8 However, it is submitted that in the majority
of cases 19 this objection would be effectively met and overcome; first
by the competitive forces of the market in that a merchant who hid
his interest rates in higher prices would find that his sales would drop
accordingly. Secondly, this objection does not apply to the finance
industry since compliance with the bill would forego hiding the
cost of a loan.
RECOMMENDATIONS

We submit that the administration of the bill could be greatly
improved by providing that the Federal Trade Commission rather
than the Federal Reserve Board be the administering agency. The
Federal Trade Commission is already regulating misleading trade
practices, and the objects of the Commission are the same as the
objects of this legislation,20 whereas the Federal Reserve Board is
not a retail trade regulatory agency.21 The major responsibility of the
Federal Reserve Board is influencing the reserves of the banking
system in the interest of economic stability and growth. Regulation
of disclosure of finance charges under the bill would differ from
administration of general monetary policy. Therefore the experienced
personnel of Federal Trade Commission would be much better suited
to the task of administration.
CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, it is submitted that in light of the magnitude of the
consumer debt, the mortgage-of current income, the increase in the
18. Id. at 8, 9.
19. Admittedly if the merchant was in a position of monopsony, the particular
consumer would not be protected; however, it is submitted that this is the exceptional
case. This bill is designed to aid the vast majority of the consuming public and the
poor credit risk would obtain residual benefits therefrom.
20. In Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
668 (1941), the Commission prohibited the use of the term "6%" in connection with
finance plans resulting in payments in excess of 6 per cent per annum. On this and

many other occasions the Federal Trade Commission, acting under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1958),

has proceeded against persons misrepresenting credit charges.

21. William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, testified to the subcommittee: "While we are in full sympathy
with the 'truth in lending' objective of the bill we also believe . . . that administration
of such legislation would not constitute an appropriate activity for the Federal
Reserve System." 1961 Hearings 276.
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bankruptcy rate due to uninformed buying, the abuses in the credit

field, 2 and the desirability for national economic stabilization there is
a real need for legislation and that this bill with only a change in the

administering agency is the best answer to that need that has been
promulgated to date.
22. Hillel Black, in his book, Buy Now, Pay Later, deals extensively with the abuses
in the credit industry but, unfortunately, through the use of loaded language, Mr.
Black makes it appear that the entire finance industry is in the loan shark category.
Some very good research went into the writing of the book and if the excessive
emotional language can be overlooked, the book may be of some use to the consumer
for general informational purposes. BLAcx, Buy Now, PAY LAram (1961).

